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WISHING ONA STAR
I. INTRODUCTION
You would feel as though you were in an oven turned on to
broil. An enormous hole has been gouged in the Earth.
Then, finally, the sky would turn black, absolutely,
completely black-everywhere all over the world.'
At first glance, with the horrors of the recent World Trade Center
attacks fresh in their memory, readers might interpret this apocalyptic
prediction as an attempt by the media to raise consciousness about the
2possibility of a nuclear bombing by terrorists. Based on the public's rush to
purchase survival equipment in response to the media's coverage of the
events following September 11, 2001, Americans would probably treat the
prediction quite seriously. In reality, however, the prediction addresses
asteroid or comet collisions with the Earth.
Because bombardments of the Earth by objects from space are
potentially as unpredictable and dangerous as terrorist attacks, a key
concern is whether public reactions to the prediction above would be
similar.4 In this instance, simply substituting a different type of disaster
would probably result in an entirely different response.5 Denial and
1. AsTEROIDs: DEADLY IMPAcT (National Geographic Television, Inc. 1997) [hereinafter
VIDEO] (comments of Dr. Eugene Shoemaker).
2. The public's increased dependence on the media to inform it of potential threats
stemming from the attacks on America may have arisen from generally "responsible" and
"controlled" coverage, which has prompted some networks to recognize a new obligation to the
public. Jason McFarley, New Yor* Times Reporter Critiques Terrorist Coverage in Notre Dame Speech,
UNIVERSrIYWIRE, Oct. 8,2001, available atLEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. For example,
in the advent of terrorism, Pat Mitchell, President and CEO of the Public Broadcasting System
(PBS), recognized the "unique position" of reporters to "shape a new balance between freedom
and security, [and] between knowledge and response." Pat Mitchell, Real World or 'Reality"
Shows?, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at A23, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
Recognizing the increased presence of the media in citizens' lives, not to mention the media's
role in providing useful information to the public, eye-catching reminders of potential threats
similar to the quote above are practically obligatory.
3. See Kim Peterson, Some Folks Go on Shopping Spreefor Surviva4 Military Equipment, COPLEY
NEWs SERvIcE, Oct. 13, 2001, at 1-2, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File
(explaining how military surplus stores have been selling out of various survival gear, even
though some merchants have raised prices as much as sixfold as compared to times predating
September 11, 2001).
4. See infra Part HA (exploring the dangers posed by asteroid or comet collisions with
Earth).
5. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (addressing public reactions to




avoidance would be the most likely outcomes. Inevitably, some people
would scoff at the notion, just as they did when astronomers predicted the
likelihood of similar Earth collisions in 1998 and in 2000.7 On both
occasions, notwithstanding the supposed certainty of the estimates, dust
from unsold survival gear drifted across the empty aisles of military surplus
stores like tumbleweeds through the streets of a ghost town."
Should policymakers and emergency preparedness personnel be
concerned that members of the public discriminate in their reactions to
different types of disaster? This Note explains why the international public,
and more precisely lawmakers, must treat infrequent, but extremely
dangerous, natural disasters more seriously. It argues that nations are
violating international law when they neglect the mitigation of exotic
transboundary crises. It highlights how the repercussions from such harmful
events cannot be as easily addressed by routine procedures that nations
typically employ when responding to more commonplace disasters.9
Ultimately, these generic measures have created a false sense of security.'0
Certain characteristics make some natural disasters more serious than
others. After all, sudden onset crises like tsunamis are more threatening
than dangers posed by gradually rising water levels created by global
warming." These differences prompt emergency response planners to factor
the public's level of disaster preparation into their rankings of threat
magnitude. 12 Consequently, those threats to which nations regularly respond
are potentially less dangerous than the ones that rarely, if ever, occur. The




6. See infra notes 84-87 (exploring a general sense of apathy and disinterest among
members of the public and the mass media and sensationalism in the entertainment industry).
7. See infra note 87 (addressing the public's reactions to scientists' recent Earth impact
predictions).
8. See David Kaplan, Col. Bubbie's Owner Benefits from Surplus of Humor, War Supplies,
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 21, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File
(noting the reasons why "the number of Army-Navy surplus stores in America has dwindled in
recent decades," and that many are surviving mainly as a result of consumers' responses to the
attacks on America and the previous Y2K predictions).
9. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (addressing the organizational difficulties
that impede attainment of the objectives of international disaster response coalitions).
10. See infra notes 97-99 (observing obstacles that limit the capabilities of multinational
hazard mitigation efforts).
11. SeeJ.M. ALBALA-BERTRAND, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LARGE NATURAL DISASTERS: WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (1993) (discussing the sudden onset category
of natural disasters and distinguishing it from variations of gradual onset disaster, for which
most nations have advance notice).
12. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMMUNITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: A MANUAL FOR
MANAGERS AND POLICY-MAKERS 5 (1999) ("Vulnerability to emergencies and disasters is a
function of the degree of exposure to hazards and of people's capacity to cope with hazards and
their consequences.").
13. KENDRICK FRAZIER, THE VIOLENT FACE OF NATURE: SEVERE PHENOMENA AND NATURAL
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Disaster planners sometimes cram the more infrequent threats into the
overarching category of "low probability, high consequence" events.'
7
Normally, policymakers must devote extra effort in preparing for such
occurrences because of the unknown risks involved. 8 For example, even
when the chances are minimal that a public area is polluted by carcinogens,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
DISASTERS 13 (1979) ("At any given moment, 1,800 thunderstorms are in progress over the
earth's surface.").
14. Id. ("If the season is late summer, one or more of... 50 hurricanes or typhoons is...
moving toward a populated coastline.").
15. Id. (explaining that "600 to 1,000 [tornadoes] a year [occur]").
16. Id. (observing how "15 to 20 times a year a quake strikes with enough energy to cause
widespread death and destruction").
17. Similar to massive biochemical contamination, for example, Earth impacts with space
bodies occupy this classification. Compare The Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Comm. on Sci. and Tech. of the House
Comm. on Sci and Tech., 98th Cong. 2d Sess. V, at 9 (Feb. 1984) (Staff Report):
[P]otential environmental risks associated with the deliberate release of genetically
engineered organisms or the translocation of any new organism into an ecosystem
are best described as 'low probability, high consequence risk'; that is, while there is
only a small possibility that damage could occur, the damage that could occur is
great.
with Michael B. Gerrard & Anna W. Barber, Asteroids and Comets: U.S. and International Law and
the Lowest-Probability, Highest Consequence Risk, 6 N.Y.U. ENVrL. LJ. 4, 4 (1997):
Asteroids and comets pose unique policy problems. They are the ultimate example
of a low probability, high consequence event: no one in recorded human history is
confirmed to have ever died from an asteroid or a comet, but the odds are that at
some time in the next several centuries (and conceivably next year) an asteroid or
comet will cause mass localized destruction and that at some time in the coming
half million years (and conceivably next year), an asteroid or comet will kill several
billion people.
Despite their low probability, historians have attributed several deaths to space bodies. See infra
notes 53 and 56 and accompanying text (describing deaths reported during China's Former
Han Dynasty and in more recent times).
18. See Colin S. Diver, Policmaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393,
431-32 (1981) (noting that policymakers should institute "comprehensive" programs to reduce
risks in "unstable environments" whenever "small errors in policy can cause irreversible or even
catastrophic harm," and citing the regulation of nuclear power plants, carcinogenic substances
in food, consumer products, and endangered species as examples of such instances); Thomas
0. McGarity & Karl 0. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REv.
461, 486 (1983) ("When conduct entails a very small probability of a very high consequence
accident, the regulatory entity must ensure that the accident never happens."). Preplanning
effectively, even without verifiable data, seems the ideal institutional response. The Rio Earth
Summit, for example, stressed the importance of preventive measures to deal with
environmental crises: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation." UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT: RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc A/CONF.
151/5/Rev. 1, reipinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, at prin. 15 (1992) [herinafter RIo DECLARATION].
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Act (CERCLA) 1 9 requires a site to be decontaminated if tests indicate that
one person in one million will contract cancer. 20 However, even in cases
where some unknown threats pose potentially greater harm than others,
planners allocate more resources to those threats that seem less far-
fetched .
Owing to political lobbying and cost benefit analyses in democratic
societies, public planners will prioritize their responses to threats based on
22their familiarity with the risks posed. With a prompt and substantial
allocation of resources, planners can theoretically measure the effectiveness
of these commitments and increase the benefit society derives from the
improvements they implement. 3 Unfortunately, this reasoning ignores the
fact that megadisasters can, and do, occur.24 Examples of these rare but
possible devastating crises include the Black Death of the Middle Ages, 2z5 the
26Mount Vesuvius eruption in Italy in Roman Times, the New Madrid
earthquake that "ripped the Mississippi Valley apart" in the early nineteenth
century,27 the potential collapse of the Cumbre Vieja volcano in the Canary
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
20. 40 C.FR. § 300.430(e) (2) (i) (A) (2) (1996). Cf Wendy E. Wagner, ChoosingIgnorance in
the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 838 n.241 (1997) ("Common-law
courts could consider regulatory standards for determining when a risk becomes significant.
Typically, Congress and regulatory agencies consider risks greater than one in one million to be
publicly unacceptable....").
21. As Professors Gerrard and Barber observe, Congress treats less severe threats than
asteroid impact with greater priority, in stark contrast to the rule favoring prevention of more
serious risks. See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 17, at 13 (assuming a one in 4000 chance of
asteroid fatality versus a one in one million chance of cancer acquisition).
22. For example, see Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POLy' ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 570 (1987), for a
description of how people make such determinations with measurable bias.
23. In the United States, crucial aspects of the government's efforts to coordinate disaster
response at the federal level are continuing policy assessments of program effectiveness and the
legal responses resulting therefrom. See Rutherford H. Platt & Claire B. Rubin, Stemming the
Losses: The Quest for Hazard Mitigation, in DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF EXTREME
NATURAL EVENTS 69, 72-74 & fig.3-2 (Rutherford H. Platt ed., 1999) (describing the
"interconnection of natural hazards, the built environment, and the legal/political system").
24. Transboundary megadisasters are the types of international crises that condition the
success of disaster response on the existence of shared duties and obligations. Some
characterize the issue as one of environmental security or "threats to national well-being or the
common interests of the international community associated with environmental damage."
JONATHAN I. CHARNEY, THE OCEANS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: SHARED U.S. AND RUSSIAN
PERSPECrIVES 6 (James M. Broadus & Raphael V. Vartanov eds., 1994) [hereinafter OCEANS].
25. See generally FRANCIS AIDAN GASQUET, THE BLACK DEATH OF 1348 AND 1349 (1908)
(exploring the disease's impact).
26. Alexandre Dumas, the historian responsible for excavations of Pompeii and
Herculaneum in 1860, noted: "It must be admitted that Vesuvius revealed itself to the world by
a master stroke. To cover land and sea with a black cloud; to send its ashes as far afield as Africa,
Syria, and Egypt, to bury two cities.., is not bad at all for a volcano that is only just setting out
on its career." WILLIAM HOFFER, VOLCANO: THE SEARCH FORVESUVIus 13 (1982).
27. WILLIAM ATKINSON, THE NEXT NEW MADRID EARTHQUAKE: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR THE
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Islands that could trigger 150-foot tsunami waves reaching the U.S. East
28Coast, Brazil, and portions of England, or the potential mutation of the
Auto Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) into an airborne virus.29 In the
aftermath of these possible but unpredictable crises, the international
community would have to mitigate harm in entirely new ways. The question
becomes one of whether planners are responding effectively to the potential
repercussions of a crisis when they cast doubt on the likelihood of the
occurrence and such doubt results in a limited allocation of resources."s
With defeatist logic prevailing in legislative and organizational circles, it is
wrong to suggest that planners are effectively working to "mitigate" the
threats of nontraditional megadisasters.
Disaster mitigation involves a number of combined measures to
respond to threats, including efforts to anticipate damage before it occurs
and develop solutions for varying levels of devastation .3 Because
MIDWEST 1 (1989). Professor Atkinson explains that, similar to a catastrophic asteroid impact,
another New Madrid will "definitely occur sometime," although that time remains unknown. Id.
(emphasis in original).
28. See Tsunami from Volcano Could Destroy E. Coast, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 30, 2001, at B10
(predicting damage). For similar predictions related to California's separation from North
America, see PEMR BRIGGS, WILL CALIFORNIA FALL INTO THE SEA? vii (1972), discussing the
loosely fitted oceanic plates that, one day, could disjoint violently from quakes occurring along
the San Andreas Fault.
29. See Dawn Brazell, Exotic Strains Not the Only Ones to Wony About, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, SC), Mar. 23, 1995, at B1, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File
(describing "rag[ing]" debates "in the scientific world" about this possibility); cf. RICHARD
PRESTON, THE HOT ZONE 408 (Anchor Books 1995) (1994) (noting the following: "The AIDS
virus is a fast mutator; it changes constantly. It is a hypermutant, a shape shifter, spontaneously
altering its character as it moves through population§ and through individuals. It mutates even
in the course of one infection .... ).
30. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing failures in the emergency
planning processes attributable to government agencies' overreliance on untested and often
unverifiable contingencies).
31. Disaster response personnel define mitigation as "steps taken to eliminate or reduce
the probability of disaster [including] stricter building codes, land-use regulation, [and]
relocations." Beverly A. Cigler, Emergency Management and Public Administration, in CRISIS
MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK 5, 7 (Michael T. Charles & John Choon K. Kim eds., 1988)
[hereinafter CRISIS MANAGEMENT]; see also Samuel Speck, Overview of Post Disaster Mitigation
Issues and Opportunities: The U.S. Experience, in SYMPOSIUM, HOUSING AND URBAN DEvELOPMENT
AFrER NATURAL DISASTERS: POST DISASTER RESPONSE AND MITIGATION OF FUTURE LOSSES 9, 9
(1985) [hereinafter ABA DISASTER SYMPOsIUM] ("Hazard mitigation is the conscious evaluation
of the impact of a hazard and the implementation of measures which eliminate or reduce our
vulnerability to its effects."). Furthermore, "[t]hree opportunities may arise to intervene in the
course of a hazard: (1) before the hazardous condition occurs or is created; (2) before the
effects of the hazard become significant; or (3) after the serious effects of the hazard have been
experienced." Id. For example, when mitigating volcano eruptions, crisis response personnel do
not merely measure the temperature of the lava or the intensity of its buildup. "Mitigation
measures taken prior to volcanic eruptions included partial evacuation of hazardous areas and
increased readiness levels." Janet K. Bradford et al., The Eruption of Mount SL Helens, in CRISIS
MANAGENIENT, supra, at 151,152.
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transboundary disasters touch the farthest reaches of the globe and threaten
the stability of the international system of governance, appropriate
32responses must necessarily be international in scope. The spreading of
losses and the conservation of resources would likewise favor the notion that
nations should work together in mitigating such natural disasters.33 From
these simple assumptions, the emergence of some sort of international
committee on transboundary disaster response should follow. Yet, the
effectiveness of organizations like the United Nations in addressing even the
more common variations of natural disaster is open to question.3
This limited response to international crises may stem from two
criticisms of international law. To a large extent, ineffectiveness results from
the fact that the principles underlying international cooperation are steeped
in moral obligations, which often are in conflict with the sovereign rights of
35nations. In short, considerations of goodwill and cultural exchange fail to
32. See COMM. ON THE ENV'T & NATURAL RES. SUBCOMM. ON NATURAL DISASTER
REDUCTION, NAT'L SC. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION: A PLAN FOR THE
NATION 24 (1996) [hereinafter PLAN FOR THE NATION] ("The resulting unrest [from natural
disasters] contributes significantly to global geopolitical instability."). As Congress recognized in
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's enabling legislation, "disasters often disrupt the
normal functioning of governments and communities." 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (a) (2) (1994).
33. See GUIDO CALEBRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 39
(1970) (reviewing the economic advantages of interpersonal loss spreading).
34. See Zama Coursen-Neff, Preventive Measures Pertaining to Unconventional Threats to the
Peace Such as Natural and Humanitarian Disastes, 30 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 647-48 (1998)
(explaining inadequacies in disaster response coordination and planning among United
Nations affiliates).
35. Take, for example, more developed nations' treatment of the Global Commons, which
include the weather, the high seas beyond a country's accepted boundary, Outer Space, and
Antarctica. See generally Harlan Cleveland, Introducing the Global Commons, NAT'L FORUM, Jan.
1990, at 4 (defining the term and describing how States have recognized these resources
internationally in legal instruments). While almost all countries have generally addressed
obligations to provide free access to the Commons, these moral considerations fall short of any
sort of duty to assist those countries with fewer resources. See V.S. Mani, The Common Heritage of
Mankind: Implications for the Legal Status of Property Rights on the Moon and Celestial Bodies, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRT"Y-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 31, 31-37
(1996) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (discussing the conflicting ideals of developed and
developing nations). Here, as in many cases, nations refuse to commit resources even though
they have subscribed to overarching principles that would morally bind them to action. See
Henri A. Wassenbergh, The International Regulation of an Equitable Utilization of Natural Outer Space
Resources, in PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 138, 139 ("Principles [governing the Global Commons] are
formulated in such a way that they remain completely non-committal, open-ended and merely
reflecting the good intentions of the States."). The difficulty of allocating resources in the deep
seabed is the most telling sign that developed countries are not interested in collaborative
efforts. See Louis de La Fayette, Common Heritage or Burden? The United States Position on the
Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law of The Sea Convention, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
212, 214 (1992) (reviewing MARKUS G. SCHMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN?
THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIME FOR DEEP SEA-BED MINING IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION (1989)) (noting that the United States repeatedly cited
economic and "national security" concerns as the reasons for refusing to adopt a jointly
managed sea-bed mining regime).
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outweigh the concerns of individual States about their own narrow
interests.36 Yet another reason explains why international lawmaking entities
have largely ignored delineating responsibility for serious transboundary
disasters.3 Simply put, nations have doubted the legitimacy of international
law. 8 In either instance, irresponsiveness to the question of international
natural disaster mitigation arises because nations do not recognize their
legal obligations.3 9 Further development of the legal principles underlying
36. In the face of disaster, absent a treaty or recognized legal obligation, nations that are
naturally concerned with their own survivability may decline to participate in collaborative
efforts on the familiar grounds that "a state is not subject to any external authority unless it has
voluntarily consented to such authority." Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and
Functions, 216 REcUEIL DES COURS 27 (1989); see also S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ.
(ser. A.) No. 10 (Sept. 7), at 18 ("The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will .... Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be
presumed.").
37. As it now stands, with regard to Earth impacts, nations have no definitive guidance
regarding the following crucial inquiries:
Shall States enter into new or more organized arrangements for asteroid
detection?... Shall States and the international community enter into preliminary
discussions as to asteroid detection? ... How shall the matter of dissemination of
information of detection of activities and dissemination of particulars of an
asteroid impact be accomplished? ... How shall decision making as to asteroid
deflection be made? Who will take action and under what conditions and
safeguards?
Eugene Brooks, Dangers From Asteraoids and Comets: Relevance of International Law and Space Treaties,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 234, 248 (1997)
[hereinafter FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM]; see also Clark R. Chapman et al., The Comet/Asteroid
Impact Hazard: A Systems Approach 10-11 (Feb. 24, 2001) (unpublished whitepaper, on file
with the Southwest Research Institute Office of Space Studies), available at http://vvw.bouder.
swri.edu/clark/neowp.html (identifying several similar unresolved "Social/Political/
Economic/Technological Issues").
38. Commentators have often doubted the reach of international law. See Geoffrey Palmer,
New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM.J. INT'LL. 259, 259 (1992) (explaining
how international lawmaking is "slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and uncertain");
Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 782 (1994) (observing the view
that "international law is not 'law' at all because it cannot be readily enforced"). For example,
from 1946 to 1984, the United States recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, when the ICJ permitted Nicaragua to sue
America for conducting paramilitary operations within its borders, see generally Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392
(Nov. 26), the Department of State withdrew its earlier recognition of the Court's jurisdiction,
see U.S. Terminates Acceptance ofICJ CompulsoryJurisdiction, 1986 DEP'T ST. BuLL.,Jan. 1986, at 67,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1743, 1744-45 (1985), and defied the terms of the ICJ's holding, which
found America liable for monetary damages. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 331-32 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the U.S. government's reaction to the
ICJ'sjudgment).
39. That scholars are unclear regarding why nations comply with legal obligations, see
Robert O. Keohane, InternationalRelations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L. LJ.
487, 491 (1997) ("We do not yet have a well-specified or empirically tested instrumentalist
theory of compliance with international commitments."), does not obscure the fact that such
duties have measurable weight. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEw
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the necessity of State action in the realm of international disaster relief will
be necessary to counteract these negative forces.
This Note uses the threat of collisions of large space bodies with the
Earth as a vehicle to investigate the legal duties of nations to participate in
collective efforts at megadisaster mitigation. Asteroids and comets are space
bodies while meteors occupy a less-threatening category.40 Although they
differ in chemical composition and in visibility to the naked eye, large space• 41
bodies can endanger multiple nations simultaneously. Space bodies are
ideal topics of investigation because the magnitude of the threats they pose
42is inestimable. Legal obligations to mitigate Earth impacts apply equally
well to other infrequent threats that are currently of the lowest priority
43among disaster response personnel.
This Note adopts a five-part analytical approach in investigating the
legal obligations to mitigate Earth impacts. Part II explores the reality of the
threats posed by space bodies. Part III investigates obstacles that have limited
the ability of nations to mitigate such threats. Part IV identifies the sources
of law underlying international legal obligations to act and prevent or
minimize such harm. Parts V and VI review numerous practices adopted by
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3-9 (1995)
(explaining reasons why "foreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general
propensity of states to comply with international obligations").
40. Comets, asteroids, and meteorites are all different entities. Both comets and asteroids
are large, while meteorites are most often small fragments of asteroids that reach the surface of
the Earth and pose no serious international threat. See What is the Difference Between Comets,
Asteroids, and Meteors?, at http://image.gsfc.nasa.gov/poetry/ask/a10590.html:
Comets are balls of ice about 1-100 kilometers across, mixed in with
pebbles and rocky material like a 'dirty snowball'. Asteroids are large 100-
meter to 500-kilometer rocky bodies that mostly are found in the asteroid
belt between Mars and Jupiter. Meteorites are small pieces of rock or ice
from asteroids or comets that intersect the Earth and enter its atmosphere
to produce meteors or 'shooting stars'.
See also E-mail from Clark R. Chapman, Southwest Research Institute, to Evan R. Seamone,
(Dec. 23, 2001) (on file with author) (explaining that "the low end of the size range [of comets
and asteroids] is a bit fuzzy but roughly 10 meters-some might say 1 meter, other may say tens
of meters" and that the small size of meteorites is incomparable to comets or asteroids).
41. See supra text accompanying note 1, infra notes 44, 47-49, and 64 and accompanying
text (describing predicted damage from space bodies that is both significant and far-reaching).
42. Meteoriticists know that space bodies fall all over and each country is equally at risk.
Michael Zolensky, The Fux of Meteorites to Antarctica, in METEORITES: FLUX WITH TIME AND
IMPACT EFFECTS, at 93, 93 (Monica M. Grady et al., eds. 1998) [hereinafter METEORITE FLUX]
("Meteorites fall with equal frequency across all corners, nooks and crannies of the Earth.").
However, space experts do not know whether they will spot space bodies in advance of impact
or how much damage will result. See infra notes 72, 75-76 and accompanying text (explaining
the inherent imprecision of even the most advanced sighting equipment).
43. See infra Parts IV, V, and VI (recognizing general principles of international law that
pertain to all megadisasters affecting multiple nations).
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nations affirming the binding nature of shared duties to mitigate
megadisasters. Part VII suggests ways in which nations can fulfill the duties
identified in the prior sections.
II. THE SERIOUS THREAT OF EARTH COLLISIONS WITH SPACE BODIES
As is the case with other variations of exotic disasters, the dangers posed
by a collision between comets or asteroids and the Earth grow with planners'
corresponding lack of preparation in developing response measures. Part
ll.A first considers what scientists and historians know of the dangers posed
by space bodies. Part ll.B explains how the current delegation of decision-
making authority to scientists inexperienced with matters of disaster
response and law has created false hope. Consequently, scientists'
incomplete response plans do not meet the requirements of true mitigation.
In the face of continuing Earth bombardments by space objects, the
international community must broaden the disaster planning process to
include the expertise of practitioners of other disciplines, including and
especially lawyers, who can construct frameworks for governing the
responsibilities of all actors responding to multinational threats.
A. REASONS FOR CONCERN OVER THE DANGERS POSED BYEARTH IMPACTS
Even though collisions with space bodies could potentially extinguish
all life on Earth, scientists were slow to appreciate the significance of the
threat. Thousands of objects from space descend to our planet's terra firma
each year.44 Space bodies typically disintegrate before entering the Earth's
atmosphere, which is protected by a "gaseous shroud" that annually
withstands several interplanetary strikes.45 But some projectiles can be so big
and move so fast that the atmosphere cannot absorb their force, at which
point damage occurs based on the size and velocity of the impacting
object.46 The destruction of the dinosaurs demonstrates the seriousness of• 47
asteroid or comet collision, as opposed to commonplace disasters. Even if
44. See E.L. KRrvNOV, GIANT METEORITES ix (1966) ("Every year a large number, probably
thousands, of meteorites in the form of iron and stone blocks fall to the Earth from
interplanetary space."); Gerrard & Barber, supra note 17, at 7 (describing how "objects about
ten meters across strike the Earth almost annually with an explosive force of about 10,000 tons
of TNT (roughly the yield of the Hiroshima bomb)").
45. D. Steel, Project Spaceguard: Will Humankind Go the Way of the Dinosaurs?, 24 IRISH ASTR.
J. 19, 21 (1997).
46. See Clark R. Chapman & David Morrison, Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids and Comets:
Assessing the Hazard, 367 NATuRE 33, 34 (1994) (discussing the importance of kinetic energy and
the mass of impacting objects in determining whether they will collide with the Earth). In
essence, "[t ] he height of fragmentation depends primarily on the meteorid's physical strength;
only the strongest iron meteoroids reach the ground in one piece." Id.
47. Geologists have explored craters all over the world and agree that asteroid impacts
have been responsible for species extinctions throughout the Earth's history, including
dinosaurs. See generally Chapman & Morrison, supra note 46 (citing various studies showing mass
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an impact would not cause the end of life, the resulting damage would be
unlike any disaster the modem international community has seen. A serious
collision could lead to the eventual "poisoning of the atmosphere through
the production of various oxides of nitrogen... [and to] global fires,
pyrotoxin production, giant tsunamis, earthquakes, severe greenhouse
warming and acidic rain."48 Even smaller objects (less than 2/3-mile or one
kilometer in diameter) could cause damage equivalent to a nuclear
detonation.49
Successive civilizations have documented their experiences with
asteroids and comets.5 0 While space objects have been hailed as "stones from
51 52heaven, "  many scientists doubted their existence. But soon after the
publication of On the Origin of Ironmasses in 1794, popular sentiments
changed when physicist Ernst Florens Chladni undertook a detailed
investigation of several Earth impacts reported since ancient times and
recognized, perhaps for the first time in that era,5 the need to treat objects
extinctions of dinosaurs and applying these findings to a threat of human extinction); REN9
GALLANT, BOMBARDED EARTH: AN ESSAY ON THE GEOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
HUGE METEORITE IMPACTS 110-12 (1964) (observing several potential impact zones where "no
doubt.., the impact would have caused a world-wide catastrophe, with all the implied
consequences"); Michael I. Rampino et al., A Unified Theory of Impact Crises and Mass Extinctions:
Quantitative Tests, 822 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. SCl. 403, 403-24 (1997) (using a mathematical model
to suggest the linkage between "impacts of larger asteroids and comets with mass extinctions of
life"). But see Gerta Keller, Asteroid Impacts and Mass Extinctions-No Cause for Concern, 822
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 399, 399 (1997) ("With the exception of the largest [space body crater]
at the Cretaceous/Tertiary boundary, none are associated with significant biotic extinctions.").
48. Steel, supra note 45, at 23.
49. See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 17, at 7 (describing the potential Hiroshima-like
blasts associated with asteroid or comet impacts).
50. See JOHN S. LEWIs, RAIN OF IRON AND ICE: THE VERY REAL THREAT OF A COMET AND
ASTEROID BOMBARDMENT 10-29 (1996) (describing historical reactions to space bodies from
across the globe); H.H. NININGER, OUT OF THE SKY: AN INTRODUCTION TO METEORITICS 4-12
(1959) (same).
51. See NININGER, supra note 50, at 4; see also KATHLEEN MARK, METEORITE CRATERS 1-2
(1987) (explaining how "meteorites have been found among relics of ancient societies in
circumstances suggesting that they were revered, possibly even worshiped"). Arguably, the Bible
refers to such phenomena. See Acts 19:35 (King James) (referring to an "image that fell down
from Jupiter").
52. See MARK, supra note 51, at 1 ("In the eighteenth century the idea that stones or pieces
of iron could fall from the sky was considered absurd by most European scientists."); id. at 5-6
(explaining how members of the Royal French Academy "discredited" accounts of fallen objects
from space as "ordinary stone [s]" in the mid 1700s).
53. See generally ERNST FLORENS FRIEDRICH CHLADNI, UEBER DEN URSPRUNG DER VON
PALLAS GEFUNDENEN UND ANDERER IHR kHNLICHER EISENMASSEN UND UBER EINIGE DAMIT IN
VERBINDUNG STEHENDE NATURERSCHEINUNGEN (Johann Friedrich Hartoch of Riga 1794).
Before this time, many doubted the phenomenon of Earth bombardment. Although Chinese
historian Homer H. Dubbs later documented several citations to "deaths by 'meteors'" in the
ancient annals of the former Han Dynasty, which existed between 89 B.C. and 25 A.D., see
NININGER, supra note 50, at 4-5 (citing II HOMER H. DUBBS, HISTORY OF THE FORMER HAN
DYNASTY BY PAN KU (1938)), early scientists easily dismissed those astronomical facts that they
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falling from space more seriously.54 Scientists soon realized that space bodies
"do not simply land on Earth out of nowhere, make a crater, then lie around
awaiting collection."5 5 They learned that space objects could kill .
Although most people have not witnessed the devastating effects of a
large object from space impacting on Earth, a consistent chain of isolated
incidents have alerted the public that such a threat is a possibility. June 30,
1908, 7:17 a.m., marked the last major event reported by living witnesses.
57
Within a matter of minutes, the largely unoccupied Tunguska region of
central Siberia (which local people knew as a peaceful forest) had been
58transformed into a clearing of stripped and burning trees. The damage was
the result of the explosion in the air of a stone meteorite ranging from
between fifty and sixty meters in length.59 The force of the blast reached
some persons as many as sixty kilometers away and threw others several
meters from where they had been standing.6 Years later, S.B. Semenov, an
eye-witness to the cosmic spectacle, still recalled that morning:
I was sitting in the porch of the house ... [W]hen
suddenly in the north.., the sky was split in two .... I felt
great heat, as if my shirt had caught on fire.... [A] t that
moment, there was a bang in the sky, and a mighty crash
could not objectively prove, demanding to witness the events with their own eyes. See MARK,
supra note 51, at 1 ("It must be remembered that investigators were attempting to establish
scientific truths about observation, and to distinguish fact from superstition; but even in the
midst of such worthy intentions, preconceived notions about [the absurdity of asteroid impacts]
were difficult to dislodge."); NININGER, supra note 50, at 9-10 (describing so-called
"authorities[']" successful attempts to conceal and ignore evidence of asteroid impacts).
54. See Ursula B. Marvin, The Meteorite of Ensisheim: 1492 to 1992, 27 METEORETICS 28, 54
(1992), available at http://adsbit.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-iarticle-query?bibcode=1992Metic
2728M (describing the far-reaching impact of Chladni's research in developing an international
awareness of Earth impact phenomena).
55. Monica M. Grady etal., Meteorites: Their Rux with Time and Impact Effects, in METEORITE
FLUX, supra note 42, at 1, 2.
56. See LEWIs, supra note 50, at 176-82 (documenting approximately 10,038 fatalities that
occurred due to space body collisions since 1420 B.C.).
57. This is not to discount the more recent experiences of bystanders like Michelle Knapp
of Peekskill, NewYork, who was sitting at home in 1992 when a "crash... shook [her] house" as
a twent)-seven pound meteorite fell from the sky and demolished her car. Clair Wood, Earth's
Inevitable Collisions, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Bangor, Maine), Jun. 30, 1995, available at LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File. Fortunately for Ms. Knapp, the space specimen and the car
fetched $69,000 at an auction. Id. In fact, objects similar to the Peekskill meteorite created
measurable devastation at least thirteen times on United States soil between 1911 and 1948.
NININGER, supra note 50, at 12-35, 43-54.
58. See KRIvNOV, supra note 44, at 125-26 (describing significant physical damage to the
Russian region).
59. For a description of the Tunguska meteorite, see generally Chris Chyba et al., The 1908
Tunguska Explosion: Atmospheric Disruption of a Stony Asteroid, 361 NATuRE 40 (1993).
60. See KRIvNOv, supra note 44, at 125-265 (citing eye-witness testimonials and
investigations of the occurrence).
1103
87 IOWA LAWREVIEW
was heard. I was thrown on to the ground about [twenty
feet] away from the porch and for a moment I lost
consciousness .... There was a thick forest there but I
don't know where it has been taken.61
Could a similar disaster happen today in a more populated area? The
answer is both clear and puzzling. Scientists are convinced that another
asteroid or comet will strike the Earth, but they cannot say exactly when.62
Aside from impacts resulting in actual damage, several close calls in
recent times highlight the need for immediate and improved response
measures. Even the last decade has not transpired without incident. In
December 2000, an asteroid named 2000 YA passed within 480,000 miles of
the Earth-a distance that astronomers called "a near miss in astronomical
terms."63 If 2000 YA had collided with the Earth, the astronomers say, the
projectile would have destroyed at least the city of London.6 4 In July 1994,
twenty-one fragments of the Shoemaker-Levy 9 Comet bombarded the
planetJupiter for over a week with such force that they darkened regions of
Jupiter's atmosphere similar to or larger than the size of the Earth.6 An
impact of the same magnitude could have extinguished the human species.
Thus, while space objects are not yet knocking on our door, they are
definitely in our neighborhood. 6"
61. Id. at 14748 (internal quotations omitted).
62. See LEwIS, supra note 50, at 209 (figuring that an asteroid impact with the potential to
kill one billion humans occurs four times each million years); Chapman & Morrison, supra note
46, at 37, 39 tbl.3 (estimating probabilities of a person's death resulting from an asteroid or
comet strike ranging from one in 3000 to one in 20,000 to one in 250,000, based on the size of
the space object and the predicted occurrence of its impact with the Earth); Gerrard & Barber,
supra note 17, at 13 (calculating that "every person statistically has a one in one million chance
of being killed by a comet or asteroid"); Steel, supra note 45, at 24 (predicting a one in 5000
chance of asteroid-related death).
63. Space Rock Terror Flies By, SUNDAY MERCURY (Birmingham, U.K.), Dec. 24, 2000, at 22,
available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
64. Id. (explaining that the impact would have created a crater "twenty times its size" or
"three quarters of a mile across").
65. See Terence Dickinson, Comet's Impact Spots Are Still Visible TORONTO STAR, Jul. 31,
1994, Sunday (final ed.), at E8, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (describing
how "[f]our of [nine impact sites], known as G, H, K and L, are approximately the size of the
Earth").
66. Other recent cosmic close calls include an asteroid "the size of a small house" that
.would have created a many kiloton explosion," which ricocheted off of the Earth's atmosphere
above Wyoming's Grand Teeton National Park, Michael B. Lafferty, Extinction Evidence Points
Skyward-- Massive Kill-offs Not Uncommon on Earth, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), Dec.
27, 1992, at 6E, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File, and an asteroid "the size of a
two-car garage[,] weighing about 100 tonnes" that exploded over the Pacific Ocean in the
vicinity of British Columbia. Terence Dickinson, U.S. Air Force Aiming for Full Asteroid Aler
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 1996, Sunday (2d ed.), at F8, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
Group File. U.S. Air Force officials also confirmed that they had "recorded an average of nine
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1B. FAILURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OFEARTHIMPACTMITIGATIONPROTOCOLS
Although government agencies have developed and funded plans to
mitigate threats posed by objects from space, these plans, by themselves, fail
to demonstrate effective preparation. Astronomers are theoretically
"mitigating" interplanetary collisions by tracking objects likely to come
within the Earth's orbit. Since at least 1998, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) has charted the course of many hundreds of
Near-Earth-Orbiting Objects (NEOs). Other nations with available
resources have also committed significant (though less) funding toward
cataloguing threatening space objects using high-powered telescopes.6
These efforts seem to convey a sense of commitment to global preparedness.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals a complete lack of disaster response
measures to deal with post-sighting conditions.6 9 Plans are confused by
unresolved international law: who gets evacuated and in what order? Who
distributes resources? Who controls the flow of refugees across borders? The
questions are infinite because the threat is inestimable. In many cases,
scientists do not have the training or knowledge to provide useful
guidance.7'
atmospheric bursts a month since 1975, all from the entry of small asteroids" into the Earth's
atmosphere. Id
67. NASA originally focused on approximately 2000 large asteroids (diameter> 1 kin) that
could orbit within a dangerous range of the Earth. See generally Steel, supra note 45, at 28
(explaining the focus of NASA and other asteroid tracking programs). NASA's Spaceguard
program is the most comprehensive of cataloguing efforts and is attempting to find "90% of the
NEOs larger than 1 km diameter.., before the end of 2008." David Morrison, Asteroid Comet
Impact Hazards: NEO FAQ at http://impact.arc.nasa.gov/introduction/faq-neo.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2001).
68. See AMES SPACE SCI. Div., NASA, SPACEGUARD SURVEYREPORT § 8.1, available athttp://
impactarc.nasa.gov/reports/spaceguard/sg_8.html (describing the need for international
coordination for the most effective alerting mechanism and reviewing a number of
international efforts).
69. See Chapman et al., supra note 37, at 1:
[E]ssentiaIly no analysis has been done of how to mitigate ... repercussions from
predictions of impacts (civil panic), how to plan for other kinds of mitigation
besides deflection (e.g. evacuation of ground zero, storing up food in the case of a
worldwide breakdown of agriculture, etc.), or how to coordinate responses to
impact predictions among agencies within a single nation or among nations.
70. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty in predicting harm
because so many space bodies strike without warning); see also NININGER, supra note 50, at 3:
Meteoritical phenomena are sufficiently rare that if it were left to a small especially
trained group to make the observations and the reports for science, the records
would be embarrassingly bare. Chance is the determining factor as to who shall see
the important meteor.... Instruction of the general public in the art of making
the most useful observations on meteors . . . will go far in determining how
frequently such knowledge as is accidentally acquired reaches the scientist
71. See Chapman et al., supra note 37, at 15 ("A much broader segment of the...
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Current efforts at cataloguing potential risks of Earth impacts also fail to
address technological inadequacies that make post-sighting response
measures a necessity. Notwithstanding tracking efforts, some asteroids and
comets will elude technology because some space objects cannot be
spotted.72 Even when sightings occur, response measures are limited because
international law is unclear about the types of actions nations can take to
defend themselves. 73 Moreover, limitations on the amount of time nations
community, beyond astronomers and space engineers [to include "the natural hazards
community," "experts in risk assessment," "public officials," and "chains of command in the
military and law-enforcement/civil defense infrastructures"], needs to appreciate and become
familiar with technical aspects of this hazard"). Understandably, and unfortunately, scientists
have little time to consider social policy issues broader than their narrowly defined duties when
reacting to space threats. See NASA Skylab Reentry: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Government Operations House of Representatives, 96th Cong. 178 (1979) [hereinafter Skylab
Hearings] (comments of Representative Walker, Member, House Comm. on Gov't Operations
and the Gov't Activities and Transp. Subcomm.):
I find many times that in dealing with scientists and technicians, they forget the
human element along the way. They get so wrapped up in the experimentation
and in all of the things dealing with technology, they forget this. I found in dealing
with them regarding the Three Mile Island nuclear problem that, while they were
concerned with all the problems of a technological and scientific nature, they
somehow forgot the human element-the people who were really concerned
about it. They dealt in terms and subject matters that the public did not
understand and that panicked them even further.
72. See Alan W. Harris, Can We Defend Earth Against Impacts by Comets and Small Asteroids?
MERCURY, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 12 ("A common criticism of Spaceguard has been that it would
leave a substantial fraction of the threat unanswered: the residual undiscovered asteroids,
asteroids that might be discovered on a collision course [before the cataloguing process is
complete] ... smaller asteroids 0.1 to 1 kilometer in diameter, and long-period comets.").
73. Although nations have an inherent right to self-defense, see U.N. CHARTER art. 51
("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense . . .. "), use of nuclear weapons to destroy asteroids complicates matters. First, fallout
from the explosion could endanger other nations. See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 17, at 9
(observing that nuclear weapons could actually "increase rather than decrease the destruction
caused by impact" by creating additional threatening fragments). Second, many have
questioned the legality of nuclear deployments in space under existing treaties. See Brooks,
supra note 37, at 246 (discussing prohibitions on warhead deployment, which could limit the
use of nuclear weaponry to defend against asteroid or comet threats). Aside from a nuclear
solution, other plans to attach solar sails to asteroids or shoot gravity altering beams of energy
to take them off course are poorly funded and hypothetical at best. Other "speculative" options
besides nuclear arms include:
pulsed lasers; kinetic energy deflection (i.e., simply striking the asteroid
with a massive projectile); mass drivers (devices that would be installed on
the surface of the asteroid, quarry the rock, place it in buckets, and fling it
into space in the right direction over a period of years); very large solar
sails that would be affixed to the asteroid and capture solar radiation to
exert pressure; and solar collectors that would capture sunlight on a
curved primary mirror, focus it onto the surface of the asteroid causing the
surface layers to vaporize, and thereby generating thrust.
[2002]1106
WISHING ONA STAR
require to effectively combat a probable strike make a nation's ability to spot
an approaching space body far less important than a nation's ability to react
to one. 4 Additionally, astronomers' impact predictions are fraught with
error. Scientists twice startled the public in the last few years by predicting
impacts within the next ten to forty years, 7 only to rescind both estimates
after mere days had passed.76
Without answering serious questions that perhaps only the law can
resolve, governments will fail in their efforts to mitigate Earth collisions. The
science of global preparation is plagued by imprecision, raising troubling
questions about whether nations can effectively prepare for a threat they
cannot accurately predict. Should they create new organizations, conduct
extensive educational programs, or begin preparing evacuations on an
international scale? Or, should they first wait for conclusive evidence that
the Earth is in danger? Governments have thus far adopted the latter
approach 7 To date, efforts to "mitigate" asteroid or comet threats have
amounted to nothing more than cataloguing objects in space. Because
astronomers admit that certain space threats that can elude their current
efforts could devastate the Earth within minutes, nations need to coordinate
their efforts beyond mere stargazing.
78
The international community should endeavor to mitigate the threat of
an asteroid or comet impact by allocating the proper resources to the task.
Gerrard & Barber, supra note 17, at 11.
74. See VIDEO, supra note 1 ("[Today, the most likely situation is zero warning. The next
impact of a mile-sized object will probably happen without any prior discovery of it at all.")
(comments of Dr. David Morrison); Steel, supra note 45, at 28 ("If there is... a large [asteroid]
... due to hit the earth in (say) 23 years, then the chances are that we will not find it ahead of
time. In fact we might not be aware of it until five or six seconds before it hits the ground.").
75. See Editorial, Earth is Safe Again-For Now, CHARLEsTON POST & COURIER ED.
(Charleston, S.C.), Nov. 8, 2000, at A14, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File
[hereinafter Safe Earth] (observing NASA's prediction on November 3, 2000 that a space object
named 2000 SG344 would strike the Earth in 2030 and scientists similar comments of 1998 that
a "mile-wide asteroid had a significant chance of hitting Earth in 2028").
76. Id.
77. Aside from international conferences on the subject and efforts to coordinate sky
searches, countries have remained noncommittal in developing a global approach. See Brooks,
supra note 37, at 241 ("There is at present no national or international project in place to
deflect asteroids and comets. Whether or not any classified deflection plan exists is, of course,
unknown."). And, while this danger is comparatively the most severe, governments prefer to
limit their involvement in exploring options. Cf Chapman & Morrison, supra note 46, at 39
("[U]ntil a threatening body is actually found, we believe that preparation of a mitigation
system would be premature and not cost-effective."); Leonard David, Asteroid Impact Motto: Be
Prepared, at http://www.space.com/sdenceastronomy/asteroiddefense010309.html (Mar. 9,
2001) (quoting a discussion with Clark PR Chapman: "It's not like we need to establish a new
federal agency for impact hazard preparedness.").
78. See supra note 77 (describing scientists' recommendations not to develop agencies to




Disaster response personnel and officials with the capacity to enact, carryout,
and enforce binding legal obligations must be adequately trained and
empowered. True mitigation requires plans to maintain communications in
the event of an impact, to evacuate impact zones, and to institute proper
response measures for guaranteeing human survival. 9  Without
implementing these measures in a coordinated and collective manner,
policymakers are confined to wishing on the stars, hoping that space bodies
will miss the Earth or disintegrate as they approach the Earth's
stratosphere.8°
III. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO MITIGATION EFFORTS
Although the preceding section outlined reasons why nations must
commit further resources to mitigating collisions of asteroids or comets with
the Earth, several enigmatic issues must be resolved before developing an
international response. Setting aside the need for an international law of
transboundary disaster, which I explore in depth in Parts V and VI, three
societal obstacles limit genuine consideration of the problem. First, the
international community must abandon its indifferent attitude towards
81space risk. Second, it must rely on organizational responses that exceed the
812scope of current disaster response efforts. Third, and perhaps most
important, it must develop legal imperatives that focus on shared
responsibility rather than on allocating blame for the damages resulting
83from disasters. After explaining the dynamics of each problem, I present
possible solutions that should make such problems amenable to further
resolution.
A. ABANDONING PuBLIC IINDEIERENCE TowARDS OUTER SPACE RISKS
One impediment to an asteroid or comet disaster response system is the
79. See supra note 31 (explaining multiple activities that constitute mitigation efforts).
Ensuring reliable communication is especially important because, no matter how advanced
global networks may be, asteroid or comet impact debris could potentially disable the satellites
orbiting above the Earth that provide such contact. See David, supra note 77 (explaining how
particle debris, let alone a direct asteroid strike, might interfere with microelectronic circuitry
in the satellites stationed in the geosynchronous orbit, "knock[ing] out, or severely disrupt[ing]
global communications").
80. The topic of organizational governance is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Perhaps,
the existence of organizations like the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) or
the Deep Sea-Bed Mining Authority provide a template for a future discussion on developing an
international crisis-response organization. Both organizations have transformed in response to
the conflicting needs, objectives, and concerns of nations with shared international
responsibilities. See infra note 226 (discussing these collaborative efforts). This Note instead
focuses on delineating shared international responsibilities and offers lawyers entree into a
discussion currently dominated by scientists with limited knowledge of the law.
81. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (addressing this obstacle).
82. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text (exploring the dilemma).
83. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text (observing the extent of this limitation).
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public's lack of concern about such threats. A common sentiment is: "Since
we don't know of anyone who has died in this way, the chance that we could
be killed in an asteroid impact is zero."84 Bolstering this view is the
Hollywood entertainment industry, which has overplayed the public's fears.
Films like Deep Impac and Armageddon,8 6 which have greatly exaggerated the
threats posed by space bodies, have caused many persons to question the
risk involved in a collision with the Earth because it is the stuff thought to be
mere science fiction. In other words, the public has found it difficult to
distinguish science fiction from scientific fact.8 7 Space may be so intangible
to most people that they cannot relate the harm posed by space bodies to
their own life experiences.
The indifference of the general public to matters relating to space has
also influenced lawmakers. Many governmental bodies seem to be waiting
for disasters to strike before explaining how the law of space operates.
According to one commentator, in space, the "[l]aw hurries up after
technology, trying to adjust its provisions to facts already occurred."5 Such
indifference is visible in the reluctance of Outer Space insurers to require
spacecraft manufacturers and operators to adopt safety precautions when
exploring space. 9 Here too, when faced with the potential for space-related
84. Steel, supra note 45, at 24. This argument has the same fallacious structure as, "Since I
have never previously died, the chance that I will die is zero."
85. DEEP IMPACr (Paramount 1997) (portraying failed attempts to destroy asteroids,
ultimately forcing the governments of the world to conduct lotteries for the selection of
1,000,0000 humans to perpetuate the species in large caves fashioned after the biblical Noah's
Ark); see also TYCus (Paramount 1998) (developing a similar plot involving the creation of a
"massive underground city" on Earth in preparation for a comet strike with the Moon).
86. ARMAGEDDON (Touchstone 1998) (involving an asteroid the size of Texas en route for
a collision with the Earth).
87. See Chapman & Morrison, supra note 46, at 38 (describing the "lack of concern-even
cynicism and incredulity that anyone should take the hazard seriously," because the hazard is an
"extreme rarity"). Some of the apathy may also relate to reporters' humorous treatment of
collisions. In one instance, editorialists compared the probability of an asteroid impact to the
likelihood of"Bill Clinton to wed Monica Lewinsky" or "Michael and LatoyaJackson being the
same person." Stephen White & Jo Merrett, Editorial, Sept. 21, 2030: 500/1: It's the End of the
World; Asteroid on Collision CourG4 MIRROR (U.K.), Nov. 6, 2000, at 13, available at LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File. No doubt, astronomers' faulty predictions have also contributed to
these mocking characterizations. See Safe Earth, supra note 75, at A14 (observing that "esteemed
astronomers' troubling tendency to issue false alarms [about asteroid threats] undermines their
credibility").
88. Maria de las Mercedes Esquivel de Cocca, Is it Necessay to Redefine Principles and Concepts
of the Outer Space Treaty?, in FORTTH COLLOQUIUM, supra note 38, at 84.
89. Pamela L. Meredith, Spacecraft Failure-Related Litigation in the United States: Many Failures,
But Few Suits, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRiY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OuTER
SPACE 22, 23 (1995) (observing that "spacecraft losses simply have been accepted as the price of
doing business in a high risk, high technology environment where standards for spacecraft
quality control are still evolving"); cf. Martin Marietta Corp. v. INTELSAT, 763 F. Supp. 1327,
1333 (D. Md. 1991) (confirming that, in the "special context" of space missions, "public policy
strongly favors enforcement of waivers of all tort claims," even though this is not the case in
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disaster, policymakers have adopted the notion that "it won't happen to
us."90 Unlike the realm of astro insurance, however, the prevailing view that
space law is so unique as to demand flexibility cannot overcome the
magnitude of the risks posed by failing to act.9
Owing to the real danger posed by asteroids or other bodies from Outer
Space, nations should implement systems to alert the public of impending
transboundary disasters and should educate the public about ways to
preserve life under such circumstances. In essence, nations commit
themselves to respond in case of danger by treating the threats as real. Such
a policy requires the development of guidelines to explain the obligations of
the shared responsibility to respond to transboundary crises.92 With these
doctrines must come oversight of those agencies responsible for such
preparedness. Stricter regulations of warning procedures must apply to all
organizations involved in sighting activities, with a uniform protocol for
assessing the reliability of predictions and a uniform scale for determining
the magnitude of the potential threats.93
Closely related to the nation's commitment is the need to educate the
public. This means educating and empowering citizens to develop
individualized response plans. The citizens' knowledge of how to evacuate
other areas of law). For the implications of these regulatory oversights, see infra note 187 and
accompanying text discussing the Skylab crisis, and infra note 113 and accompanying text
discussing the fall of the Mir Space Station.
90. Chapman & Morrison, supra note 46, at 39.
91. See Barton Beebe, Note, Law's Empire and the Final Frontier:. Legalizing the Future in the
Early CorpusJuris Spatialis, 108 YALE L.J. 1737, 1764 (1999) (describing how space law moved
toward the position advocated by Myres McDougal that policies should develop from
.continued accretion" of our international experience, rather than a Hamurabic code (citing
Myres S. McDougal & Leon Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 407,
420 (1958))). These views conflict with Maxwell Cohen's idea that governments cannot risk
being unprepared, as they might only have a single chance to address certain space-related
issues. Maxwell Cohen, Introduction: Law and Politics in Space, in LAw AND POLITICS IN SPACE 11
(Maxwell Cohen ed., 1964). The idea of global disaster preparedness strikes quite a different
note. In this case, no matter what the disaster may be, it is always better to plan ahead, even if
one does not know the extent of a threat.
92. See JOvIcA PATRNOGIC & BOSKO JAKOvLJEvIC, INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW,
COLLECTION No. 8, PROTECTION OF HUMAN BEINGS IN DISASTER SITUATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 8, 9 (1989) (recognizing the importance of codified principles as a
necessary coordinating tool).
93. While isolated agencies, such as the International Astronomical Union's Working
Group on NEOs, have instituted preliminary recommendations to address the issue of hazard
estimation, see Chapman et al., supra note 37, at 8 (describing international efforts to adopt a
72-hour peer-reviewed space body threat confirmation process and advocating the need to
improve it), without a uniform process ensuring the validity of future predictions, diverging
efforts at prediction could be of little help even if correct. Cf (U.S.) PANEL ON THE PUBLIC
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (1975) [hereinafter EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION
POLICY] ("A popular theme currently being espoused among some scientists and science
popularizers is that 'prediction might be more devastating than the event itself.'").
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heavily populated areas may determine to what extent a nation is harmed by
a transboundary disaster. At present, persons entrusted with responding to
disaster stress that people themselves make disasters happen by their own
reactions to naturally occurring phenomena.94 The veil of technology
separating the general public from Outer Space threats-the "quick fix" to
the problem of impact mitigation9"--may create more harm than good if
nations do not make the effort to work with the public in the name of
survival education. 9
B. RELYING ON ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF CURRENT
DISASTER RESPONSE EFFORTS
A second obstacle to Earth impact mitigation is the natural tendency for
disaster response planners to mistakenly believe that the approach used for
dealing with localized threats will address harms stemming from
megadisasters. Even in responding to commonplace crises, problems faced
by current experts are mainly ones of coordination.97 Several organizations
commonly respond to a single disaster and often waste or misallocate their
energies because they have different priorities.98 Agencies can exhaust
94. See FRAZIER, supra note 13, at 14 ("In one important sense there is no such thing as
natural disaster. A disaster is a social phenomenon. Across our planet for about four and a half
billion years, the forces of nature have shaped, molded, and changed the earth."); Denis
Binder, The Duty to Disclose Geologic Hazards in Real Estate Transactions, 1 CHAP. L. REv. 13, 45
(1998) (explaining that "[t]here are no natural disasters [because] human activity invites the
resulting tragedy...").
95. See FRASIER, Ssupra note 13, at 326-27 (describing criticisms of the view that technology
becomes a mere "quick fix" to respond to disasters, when in fact it can be "counterproductive by
increasing misplaced reliance").
96. See EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION POLICY, supra note 93, at 103 (noting the "equal danger
that hazard-reduction programs instituted by responsible public agencies may sometimes hurt
some of the people while helping others"); SUANDRA K. SCHNEIDER, FLIRTING WITH DISASTER:
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS SITUATIONS 6 (1995) ("[T]he key to a successful governmental
response depends on the extent to which postdisaster human behavior corresponds to prior
governmental expectations and planning.").
97. SeeJohn Kusler, Impediments to Mitigation, in ABA DISASTER SYMPOSIUM, supra note 31,
at 2, 4 ("Coordination problems in relief and recovery efforts are common in both developing
and developed nations with little definition of common long term mitigation goals by
participating organizations.").
98. See PATRNOGIC &JAKOVLJEVlC, supra note 92, at 8 ("[M hen there is no proper and
efficient coordination of action of so many participating actors ... [t]he result is a waste of
efforts and materials, duplication, and needs which are not satisfied while on the other hand
there are surpluses."). This inevitable problem of "multiorganizational suboptimality" exists in
many collective public sector endeavors. DONALD CHISHOLM, COORDINATION WITHOUT
HIERARCHY: INFORMAL STRUCTURES IN MULTIORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS 5 (1989). In these
instances, "because each organization pursues its own goals, such a system permits the
coexistence of incompatible goals, encourages the avoidance of responsibility, and involves
costly duplication and overlap." Id. As commentators note with respect to disaster response:
"This problem of better coordination is a serious one, it should be tackled from the political,
organizational and legal angles." PATRNOGIC &JAKOVLJEvIC, supra note 92, at 8-9.
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resources by the time victims most need them. Such losses are usually
accepted as an implicit cost given the unpredictability of disasters.9 Because
the inadequacies of disaster response have not yet been felt on a grand scale
where widespread crises affect multiple populations simultaneously, these
difficulties have not received the criticism they deserve. The response to
everyday natural hazards presents a misleading picture. 100 The unique
disasters that comprise the focus of this Note demand coordinating activities
at the international level. They require effective preplanning for effective
mutual action, which, in turn, raises a number of important inquiries.
The greatest problem with disaster planning among cooperating
agencies is that the plans they lay out have often become ends in
themselves-having a plan in place takes priority over how well reasoned the
plan is.' 0' In the case of high-magnitude threats, some critics may question
whether people can plan effectively. On the one hand, there are few ways to
test a plan that requires near total devastation before knowing whether it
would work. The lack of predictability is simply much too great. '1 2 On the
other hand, assuming nations could develop means to achieve social stability
and order in the aftermath of mass human annihilation, it can be
questioned whether the survivors would need to preserve such systems that
formerly existed. Put differently, there may be no use for a plan to preserve
order in a society if the society no longer existed.1
0 3
To solve the problem of misplaced reliance on the hope that routine
responses to crisis will work effectively (or the related defeatist concern that
99. See BEVERLEY RAPHAEL, WHEN DISASTER STRIKES: How INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES
COPE WITH CATASTROPHE 30 (1986) ("For the most part we do not know what disasters may
await us or when they might occur. It is this lack of ability to know what, or when, that turns
many natural or man-made occurrences into the truly disastrous catastrophes they become.");
cf. David W. Sar, Helping Hands: Aid for Natural Disaster Homeless vs. Aid for "Ordinary Homeless, "7
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 139 (1995) ("[E]very type of disaster relief aid will be inefficient in
some way because disaster relief does not occur in a competitive market.").
100. In other words, nations cannot afford to take a local approach. See IAN BURTON ET AL,
THE ENVIRONMENT AS HAZARD 172 (1978) ("Because events on the higher end of the
magnitude scale are exceedingly rare, the accumulation of experience can be enhanced if
nations share their experience rather than continuing to rely on knowledge of rare events
occurring within their own territories.").
101. See generally LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME
DISASTER 2 (1999) (noting, throughout his book, instances in which "organizations and experts
use plans as forms of rhetoric, tools designed to convince audiences that they ought to believe
what an organization says [when such] plans have so little instrumental utility in them that they
warrant the label 'fantasy document'") (emphasis omitted).
102. For example, many "[pilans for recovery after general nuclear war are fantasy
documents because the knowledge and experience necessary to know what would make for a
realistic plan are unavailable." Id. at 14.
103. As Professor Clarke posits of the aftermath of nuclear warfare: "[T ] he biggest question
of all [is]: 'Would there be anything to return to?' By [planners'] own logic, the answer would
be 'No.' If that were so, however, and if the overall society had been leveled in nuclear warfare,
what, finally, would be the point of trying to defend against nuclear attack?" Id. at 93.
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no measures could assist a civilization faced with utter annihilation), nations
should adopt a collaborative dual/all-hazards civil defense approach to
megadisaster. This approach requires three steps. First, planners should
embrace ProfessorJeremy Waldron's view of "fall-back" rights as the guiding
principles for megadisaster mitigation planning.14 This notion asserts that
the delineation of rights and duties to deal with a total breakdown in
relationships that people rarely question promotes efficiency and stability in
the normal course of such relationships, even when danger is not
imminent.1 5 Second, planners should adopt an outlook similar to one
instituted in the 1970s by the directors of civil defense programs to address
nuclear attacks. This perspective allowed for planning even under uncertain
conditions. 0 6 Finally, developed nations should recognize the value of the
104. JeremyWaldron, WenJustice Replaces Affection: The NeedforRights, 11 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 625, 629 (1998) ("The structure of rights is not constitutive of social life, but instead to be
understood as a position of fall-back and security in case other constituent elements of social
relations ever come alpart.").
105. For example, Professor Waldron points to the European Convention on Human
Rights: "'No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.'" Id. at 643 (quoting European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953), reprinted in ARTHUR HENRYROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 294-95 (1977)). On a
theory of fall-back rights, while "in ordinary political arrangements between state and citizen,
the issue of torture simply does not arise ... people need this as something to fall back on when
normal politics collapse." Waldron, supra note 104, at 643. Having the rights and duties in
place, in fact, drives society in new directions and "provide[s] a dynamic for social progress by
challenging the existing types of relationships with new ones." Id. at 631.
106. See CLARKE, supra note 101, at 95 ("The years 1974 through 1976 . . . saw the
development of the last major element of Mul-spectrum preparedness-contingency planning
to relocate (evacuate) people from U.S. metropolitan areas and other risk areas during a period
of several international crises."). Attainment of realistic planning objectives involved drawing
analogies to disasters that the world had experienced and projecting not one, but chains of
successive catastrophes. See id. at 93 ("While it is not necessary to argue that nuclear war is some
sort of everyday affair, it is necessary to argue that it is sufficiently like something that we know
as to lend itself to operational rationality." Id. at 93 (emphasis in original). Hence, the birth of
"dual-or all-hazards planning," or marshalling the same resources used to combat the
devastation of natural disasters with nuclear ones. Id. at 94. Officials observed the spill-over
effects of these multipurpose efforts:
Civil defense readiness generates, as a bonus, an improved capability on the part of
a State or local government to conduct coordinated operations in the event of
peacetime emergencies. If State and local governments are prepared to deal with
the worst of all possible situations-a nuclear emergency [and, in this case, a
severe asteroid impact]-it is a reasonable assumption that these governments can
handle lesser emergencies-hurricanes, floods, etc.-effectively and efficiently.
But, should a State or local government turn a blind eye to the nuclear attack
aspect of civil preparedness [or, in this case, severe asteroid impact], its ability to
respond to a lesser disaster becomes questionable.
James R. Schlesinger, CivilDefense Programs: Roles and Missions, FORESIGHT,Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 2-3.
And, just as in the case of planning for nuclear war, in the case of planning for an asteroid or
comet impact, it is reasonable to fathom survivors who will need a set of rehabilitative
1113
87 IOWA LAWREVIEW
experience of less developed nations in overcoming natural disasters. That
should lessen the fear that only the more developed nations should be
included in plans to mitigate serious natural threats.107 This final
consideration should help alleviate doubts that economic disparity prevents
all hopes of an effective multinational effort.
10 8
C. REJECTING BLAME ALLOCATIONAS THE MEANS TOESTABLISHINTERNATIONAL
DUTES
The third obstacle limiting successful mitigation of transboundary
megadisaster is the overarching reliance on the principles of blame and
culpability in resolving matters concerning international obligations. In
areas less abstract than space, nations have had difficulty delineating their
individual responsibilities, even though they recognize their mutual
duties.'0 9 Aside from the fact that all nations cannot equally contribute
resources in the mitigation of disasters, the lopsided development of disaster
law makes it questionable whether nations have obligations to assist one
another before disaster strikes. Complex systems for delineating
responsibility for man-made disasters already exist, ° while the law dealing
guidelines-if not to perpetuate their respective nations, then the survival of their species. In
the aftermath of huge disasters, "[t] here is recovery from even the worst of earthquakes. There
is a place to go to even in the biggest of fires-because you could go to another city until yours
is rebuilt. The all-clear will eventually be sounded. There will be life after catastrophe." CLARKE,
supra note 101, at 96 (emphasis in original).
107. Because "[t]he most highly organized preparation exists in communities and societies
that have repeatedly and recently experienced ... disaster," FRAZIER, supra note 13, at 340
(citation omitted), developed nations can learn from even the third-world. See PLAN FOR THE
NATION, supra note 32, at 24-25 ("As a world leader, the United States cannot afford to focus its
efforts on disaster reduction on a domestic scale only; it must continue to take a global
approach .... Continuing [international] cooperation will enable the United States to learn
from the experience and expertise of other nations.").
108. See supra note 35 (describing traditional problems like fears of free-riding by less
developed nations that have prevented developed nations from including all countries in their
international efforts). In this regard, shared experience presents a source of human capital that
can increase the value of collaborative efforts. Such was the case, for example, in the United
States government's joint efforts in the U.S./Mexico Project on Hydrometeorolgical
Phenomena in the Brownsville/Matamoras. See generally Richard W. Krimm, Transfering
Mitigation Techniques Between Developed and Developing Nations, in ABA DISASTER SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 31, at 32-33 (describing how the development of six working groups allowed for successful
dissemination and sharing of disaster mitigation strategies).
109. For example, although the international courts have procedures to assess monetary
damages, high burdens of proof of causation make dispute resolution nearly impossible. See
Devereaux F. McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of State
Responsibility for InternationalDisasters, 1986-1996, 25 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 659, 675-76 (1996)
(explaining how tort law has failed to settle legal disputes over nuclear disaster due to the
difficulty of proving causation scientifically).
110. See M.F. Lechat, The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction: Background and
Objectives, 14 DISASTERS 1, 3 (1990) (noting "specific" measures to deal with man-made disasters
but pointing out the problems facing planners posed by unpredictable natural disasters).
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with asteroid or comet impact is largely undefined and hypothetical. The
byproduct of this uneven development is a toolbox of reactive rather than
proactive methods-tools that work better to address man-made problems
because they focus almost entirely on blame and culpability.
By waiting until disaster occurs before acting, courts and governments
depend entirely on blame to resolve international controversies. Though it
is possible to assign blame for oil spills and the misuse of energy sources,111
nations cannot easily assign blame for a tsunami or an earthquake."' While
the economic market suggests an alternative for compensating losses in the
latter cases (e.g., providing insurance protection against earthquake
damage)," s in the case of collisions with large space bodies, the private
sector would be helpless to intervene. There may be no economic remedy
for damages caused by a crisis so massive." 4 Additionally, large-scale disasters
would force countries to mobilize expensive technologies that would be
unavailable to private entities."5
Notwithstanding the drawbacks of employing a system depending on
the determination of culpability, one might expect that blame-oriented
approaches-by deterring negligence-would force nations to recognize
their mutual responsibilities. But courts are often helpless to do so, even
when addressing States' moral and financial obligations related to man-
made disasters.1 6  Efforts to enforce international environmental
111. See McClatchey, supra note 109, at 677-78 (discussing how strict liability and negligence
standards can achieve the goal of compensation for man-made disasters).
112. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, Should We Establish a Guardian for Future Generations?, in
SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, MORALS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 65,
80 n.25 (1996) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ESSAY~] (noting that mitigation of an asteroid
threat "would be... distinct in the way we would be eliminating a peril we did not cause (the
way in which we 'cause' toxic wastes)"). In fact, courts often refer to asteroid impacts as "acts of
God," an entity from which recovery is quite unlikely. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. J.F. Shea
Co., 445 F. Supp. 365, 368 (D.D.C. 1978) (observing that a "falling meteorite" or an "outside
force, such as an explosion [or] earthquake" is beyond the control of mankind).
113. For example, the Russian government's first step in dealing with the Mir Space
Station's fall back to Earth was to insure itself against liability for $200 million. See Editorial, Mir
Headed for Crash into the Ocean, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 22, 2001, at YO7, available at LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File (suggesting that Russia's act of obtaining $200 million in
liability insurance was "perhaps most telling" of the seriousness of the event).
114. Cf EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 71 (The United Nations University
1989) (1988) ("Long-term damage to people, particularly to children, from exposure to
radiation and to [contaminated] soils and ecosystems remains unclear and will never be fully
compensated.").
115. See UNITED NATIONS, THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE EXPLORATION AND
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, DISASTER PREDICTION WARNING AND MITIGATION:
BACKGROUND PAPER 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.184/BP2 11-13 (1998) (describing a number of
international emergency communications systems that mainly require coordinated efforts with
governmental entities in order to function). These measures show that victims of a mass disaster
must depend upon highly-trained government entities to mobilize life-preserving resources.
116. SeeTannerv. ARMCO Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 536-37 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (refusing
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responsibilities are likewise hopeless because such international
organizations as the United Nations rarely institute measures that compel- 117
compliance, and courts frequently cannot determine precisely the
economic costs of the harm.n 8 Because remedial action depends upon the
damage incurred in particular instances, nations would not know what
liability to expect until actual damage results. Such uncertainty paralyzes
international cooperative efforts to plan effectively for large-scale disasters.
Solving this problem of misplaced reliance requires no more than the
realization that anticipatory action is the workable method of mitigating
impacts with space bodies and similar types of megadisasters. To make any
sense of the duty to mitigate global catastrophes, the international legal
system must promote the idea that preventive and anticipatory action-
cooperating for the reduction of serious international threats before they
occur--is the only way that sovereign, but dependent, nations can reduce or
prevent resulting damage." 9 Remaining true to the principle of anticipatory
action should avoid many questions that stem from the ex post
determinations required to assign blame. To make this shift requires the
recognition of international duties to cooperate, warn, and mitigate threats.
It also requires the creation of a new international body through which to
to recognize environmental rights because "from an institutional viewpoint, the judicial process,
through constitutional litigation, is peculiarly ill-suited to solving problems of environmental
control" and because "the inevitable trade-off between economic and ecological values presents
a subject matter which is inherently political and which is far too serious to relegate to the ad
hoc process of 'government by lawsuit' in the midst of a statutory vacuum"); McClatchey, supra
note 109, at 663-64 (describing the reluctance of the Soviet Union to deal with the international
damage caused by Chernobyl because of ill-suited legal structures); Larry E. Potter et al.,
Encouraging Proenvironmental Behavior: The Environmental Court as a Contingency Manager, 27 ENV'T
& BEHAV. 196, 197-98 (1995) (illustrating how punitive blame-based systems undermine
environmental protection by creating "contingency relationships" where organizations benefit
more by violating the law and detailing how a court must shift from its normal role in criminal
matters, often inducing inspectors and the scientific enforcement community to lose
confidence in the courts).
117. See Linda A. Malone, "Green Helmets". A Conceptual Framework for Security Council
Authority in Environmental Emergencies, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 515, 519 (1996) (noting the lack of
internationally organized task forces to respond to environmental emergencies, even though
thirteen countries have proposed creating forces wearing green helmets to signify
environmental enforcement, resembling the blue helmets adorned by United Nations
peacekeeping forces).
118. See McClatchey, supra note 109, at 673 (noting that "while international law
concerning environmental disasters has progressed rapidly.., it has remained stubbornly static
in the area of liability for transboundary harm" and listing a number of treaties that "sidestep"
the issue of calculating damages).
119. Chernobyl teaches an important lesson because the world bad to see the horrors of a
nuclear calamity first-hand before it understood the need for preventive measures, including
legal rules. See generally id. (reviewing the development of transnational disaster law). Adopting
the same approach with respect to asteroid threats presumes that people will leave ground zero
having learned their lessons about future preparation, just as they did in the aftermath of
Chernobyl. Furthermore, this decisional model ignores the fact that Chernobyl's devastation
pales in comparison to even a minimal asteroid impact the likes of Tunguska.
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coordinate efforts to reduce the effects of more irregular transboundary
threats.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Even with preliminary solutions to overcome the obstacles preventing
Earth impact mitigation, it is necessary to define the extent of nations' rights
and obligations in the mitigation process. Delineating international
responsibility requires the consideration of the sources of international law.
Nearly every work on the subject raises three potential candidates as the
foundation upon which legally binding obligations are built: treaties,
customary internationaf law, or general principles of international law.
12 1
There is some concern over which of these sources should take prioity.
122
Therefore, Part IV briefly explores the reasons why general principles of
international law-rather than other sources of law-are especially relevant
in attempting to resolve the legal questions underlying obligations to
mitigate collisions between space bodies and the Earth.
Treaties are perhaps the most compelling source of law because they
indicate when nations have assumed binding legal obligations.
123
International law recognizes the weight of treaties in the principle of pacta
sunt servanda (that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith" 24). While there are treaties
that address the responsibility of nations to aid astronauts in distress or warn
120. This assertion, of course, presumes that States will comply with binding obligations,
which is a valid concern given the sources addressed supra note 38, which explore doubts about
the extent and enforceability of international law. However, I refer to my discussions infra Part
VII to explain my faith in States' willingness to comply with principles of cooperation in
mitigating such disaster.
121. One of the foremost authorities on the sources of international law is the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, art. 38(1) (a)-(d), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to Charter of United Nations and forming an "integral part" of the
Charter) (defining "international conventions," "international custom," and "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as the preeminent sources of international
law).
122. See L ICOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (4th ed. 1997) ("There is a principle to
the effect that a special rule prevails over a general rule (lex specialis derogat legi generali), so that,
for example, treaty rules between states as lex specialis would have priority as against general
rules of customary law between the same states."); id. at 97 (explaining the "hostile attitude of
many states to general principles as an independent source of international law"); Jose E.
Alvarez, Positivism Regained, Nihilism Postponed, 15 MICHJ. INT'L L. 747, 757 (1994) (reviewing
G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITr (1993) and summarizing
the argument that a general principle of law "is nearly void for vagueness and contains so few
examples that it probably can be ignored or reduced to mere subsidiary evidence of law, like
the writings of scholars").
123. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing nations' deference to their
voluntarily assumed responsibilities).
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339, 8 I.L.M. 679, 690.
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each other of impending danger when exploring or using Outer Space,'
none of these treaties have yet addressed the question of a collision between
space bodies and the Earth. 2 6 While such treaties may very well direct a
nation that spots an approaching asteroid or comet to warn others, the
problem with relying on a treaty-based duty to give warning is that warnings
presume the actual notice of an impending threat. This is hardly the case in
all major asteroid or comet collisions.127 Furthermore, effective planning
would require further delineation of duties to combat the extreme
devastation caused by an impact.
28
Customary international law also encompasses duties extending beyond
the limits of the explicit wording of treaties. So lorig as countries manifest
their commitments to a certain practice in their relations with other nations,
duties to comply with the course of former performance may very well exist
129with the same force of law as a treaty-based obligation. In The Paquete
Habana case,130 for example, the United States Supreme Court held that, as
long as a custom could be established through historical international
practice, "international law is part of our law." 13  Yet, a customary
international duty to collaborate in response to Earth collisions would
require prior international commitments specifically to react to these
threats. As Part II.B explained, the lack of historical commitment among
scientists to treat such threats seriously raises questions about whether
cataloguing efforts are so historically entrenched as to constitute binding
obligations among nations. 132 Because most nations are noncommittal as to
their obligation to respond to Earth collisions, customary international law,
125. For an example of such a treaty, see infra note 204 and accompanying text, which
discusses relevant provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.
126. See Brooks, supra note 37, at 248 (posing unanswered questions about States'
obligations to respond to Earth collisions).
127. See supra note 74 (describing the unpredictability of asteroid or comet collisions with
Earth and the possibility that an approaching space body may be overlooked).
128. See supra note 31 (defining multiple aspects of natural disaster mitigation).
129. Customary international law involves two major factors. For an obligation to be
binding, all countries must first subscribe to a rule of law, even though it is not directly stated in
a treaty. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE 26 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955) ("International jurists speak of a custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing
certain actions has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according
to International Law, obligatory or right.") (emphasis in original). Second, these countries must
demonstrate, through their actions, that they are voluntarily adhering to the law rather than
simply recognizing it symbolically as a matter of diplomacy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (requiring the demonstration
of an actual "sense of legal obligation" or opinio juris sive necessitatis on the part of States
subscribing to a practice).
130. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
131. Id. at 700.




in all probability, would prove an ineffective tool.1 33
General principles of international law operate differently from treaties
or customs in that they "belong to no particular system of law, but are
common to them all." 134 They exist as gap-fillers to help prevent cases in
which international courts cannot resolve a disputed issue. 3 5 The key
feature of this source of international law is its focus on national practices
that collectively indicate obligations to fulfill certain duties. Examples of
general principles include the duty to negotiate in good faith and the
concept of estoppel. 3 6 This source of binding international law
accommodates the multiple practices within and between states adhering to
a principle of cooperative preservation. In order to establish a general duty
to prevent Earth impact collision, nations must adopt practices aimed at
ensuring survival and further commit themselves to participate collectively
in achieving this objective.
V. THE HISTORICALLYENTRENCHED RIGHT TO GLOBAL SURVIVAL
The legal approaches below rest on a principle requiring global
cooperation for the preservation of individual nations within a collective
disaster response effort (hereinafter cooperative preservation). At the most
basic level, all nations are bound to a well-recognized duty of self-
preservation. 17 Cooperative preservation extends this duty by recognizing
that some threats are so significant as to require a nation to participate in a
group addressing the problem before it can successfully fulfill its obligation
of self-preservation. 138 By this token, if preplanning is the only way to limit
harm to a nation-and, by virtue of such necessities as massive international
evacuation, the nation is forced to cooperate with other nations-the duty to
collaborate trumps the sovereign right to limitjoint mitigation efforts.
A. THE DuTY OFSELF-PRsERVATION
International mitigation of an asteroid or comet impact depends on the
existence of a global right to survival and the correlative international duty
133. See supra note 37 (posing a number of unanswered questions about the responsibilities
of nations in responding to an Earth impact crisis).
134. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 390 (1953).
135. See SHAW, supra note 122, at 78 (explaining that general principles are necessary to
prevent the non liquet or legal issue that cannot be resolved by international courts: "[W]hile
there may not always be an immediate and obvious rule applicable to every international
situation, 'every international situation is capable of being determined as a matter of law'")
(citation omitted).
136. See id. at 80-81 (citing cases).
137. See infra notes 139-40, 161-67 and accompanying text (explaining this long-established
duty).
138. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (recognizing ways in which the duty
extends to international cooperation).
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of nations to enforce that right. At the most basic level, two components
serve as building blocks for this right. First, nations must recognize their
active roles in intervening to protect their citizens. Early jurists, such as
Vattel, codified the principle of international law underlying this duty:
The end or object of civil society is to procure for the
citizens whatever they stand in need of for the necessities,
the conveniences, the accommodation of life, and, in
general, whatever constitutes happiness,-with the peaceful
possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with
security, and, finally, a mutual defense against all external
violence....
In the act of association, by virtue of which a multitude
of men form together a state or nation, each individual has
entered into engagements with all, to promote the general
welfare; and all have entered into engagements with each
individual, to facilitate for him the means of supplying his
necessities, and to protect and defend him. It is manifest
that these reciprocal engagements can not otherwise be
fulfilled than by maintaining the political association. The
entire nation is then obliged to maintain that association;
and as their preservation depends on its continuance, it
thence follows that every nation is obliged to perform the
duty of self-preservation.
13 9
This right is not negative in nature, but positive. 140 In other words, the
government is not obligated strictly by morality, but, rather, by the need to
sustain itself, which guarantees the existence of its sovereignty.
Second, nations must cooperate with other nations in order to fulfill the
duty of self-preservation. Using Earth collision as the test case, because the
threat is unpredictable and can likely harm more than one nation, it stands
to reason that States must develop contingencies together and share certain
139. EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 4 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1876)
(1758); see id. at 5 ("[C]ivil society is so useful, nay so necessary to all citizens, that it may well be
considered as morally impossible for them to consent unanimously to break it without
necessity .... [I] n general, as long as the political society subsists, the whole nation is obliged to
endeavour to maintain it."); id. ("If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is no less obliged
carefully to preserve all its members."). For a detailed exploration of the principle of self-
preservation as applied to territorial matters, see CHENG, supra note 134, at 32-68 (reviewing
cases).
140. See Penny Lewis, Rights Disclosure and Assisted Suicide, 27 AM.J.L. & MED. 45, 50 (2001)
(explaining that a negative right constitutes a right to "non-interference," whereby "others have
a duty not to interfere with the individual's [choices]," while a positive right or "welfare right"
means that "others have a duty to assist the individual [in need]").
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resources before the threat materializes in order to reduce the threat to
their own people. This is true especially because space bodies have the
141potential to force the evacuation of entire nations.
Views are likely to diverge on this point. Some observers will definitely
see the precommitment of resources to a cooperative preservation effort as
meeting their own duty to maintain sovereignty. However, others might see
such commitments as reducing their sovereignty, assured that they should
alone decide the amount of resources, if any, to commit and the degree to
142which they should cooperate. Although total disregard for the reality of an
143
imminent threat would violate their duty of self-preservation, nations
inevitably will refuse collaborative efforts without first articulating their
rationales. 1 " The more desirable position reasons that cooperation must
follow because the global power to govern hinges on the right of sovereign
nations to survive, which in turn hinges on the right of individuals to
survive. 145 To achieve this position, Part V.B adopts a historical approach that
places both elements of the duty of cooperative preservation (i.e., individual
and collective self-preservation) in context, explaining why historical
practice would not violate customary international law pertaining to, and
distinguishing historical duties from, newer types of entitlements.
B. SELF-PREsERVA TIONASDISTiNCT.FROM NEWER AND MORE ABSTRACT RIGHTS TO
THEENVIRONMENT
To understand how the duty of cooperative preservation unfolds,
141. See supra notes 1, 44,47-49, 64 and accompanying text (explaining that environmental
devastation can be so severe that massive relocations might be the only way to preserve States'
continued functioning).
142. In isolation, certain general principles of international law seem to favor this view. See
CHENG, supra note 134, at 67 ("With regard to international obligations, the right of the State to
adopt measures necessary to ensure the welfare and security of the community in exceptional
circumstances cannot be considered as being impaired by general provisions contained in
treaties entered into with reference to normal circumstances."). Yet, even on this view,
principles of necessity may still contravene the right to close off borders to other nations in
need. See id. at 69-102 (exploring this principle).
143. SeeJohn C. Kunich, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, 41 A.F. L. REV. 119,
126 (1997) ("To do nothing [in the event of an asteroid threat] is to abdicate our duty to
defend the United States, and indeed the entire world, and place our very survival in the
uncertain hands of the false god of probabilities.").
144. See supra note 39 and accompanying discussion (explaining the general assumption
that nations do act on legal commitments of which they are aware and to which they acquiesce).
145. These assumptions rely on the notion that individual and collective rights are
inextricably linked. See Jennifer A. Downs, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment: An
Argument for a Third Generation Righ, 3 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 351, 366 (1993) (noting that
"first and second generation rights have collective aspects, and therefore any theoretical
fi-amework loathe to accommodate collective elements was subverted long ago") (referring to
Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protections of the Rights of Individuals Rather then States,
32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 48 (1982) ("[T]he effective exercise of a collective right is a precondition
to the exercise of other rights.")).
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lawmakers must distinguish the historical right to survive from the subset of
more abstract environmental rights. Here, nations' historical compliance
upholding certain survival-based duties reveals their binding nature, as
opposed to impotent rights, which have only recently been recognized.
46
Scholars often refer to this less virile strand of entitlements with the all-
encompassing term "right to environment., 4 7 They concede the importance
of basic needs for survival, 14 but fail to recognize the codification of such
principles before the 1960s, 149 or more "recent years., 5 0 In effect, they deny
ancient rights to survival by saying that the right to environment emerged in
the last few decades. The right to survival described here does not refer to
modem holistic notions that seek to maximize all aspects of an individual's
physical, psychological, and spiritual well being.15 ' Instead, I limit the
concept to the bare essentials required for human subsistence. Most
recognize these entitlements as the right to "have air to breathe, water to
drink, food to eat, and a place in which to live and sleep."152 In essence,
these rights pertain only to the natural resources necessary for human
survival. Consequently, they constitute the foundation upon which other
rights are built. Or, stated differently, "Survival, the most fundamental
146. Some identify this ecological cluster of rights as "adjectives [that] include: decent,
healthful, natural, pure, clean, ecologically-balanced, and safe [environments]." Melissa
Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY 301, 309
(1991).
147. Id.
148. See DIANA T. MEYERS, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: A DEFENSE 1 (1985) (noting that, while
some natural rights theories are questionable, "the fundamental normative load carried by
natural rights-that persons ought to be guaranteed a core of personal security and
autonomy-is almost irresistible"); Larry Rasmussen, Human Environmental Rights and/or Biotic
Rights, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 36, 39 (Carrie Gutafson & Peter
Juviler eds., 1999) (noting that "[e]cocide is homicide").
149. See Thorme, supra note 146, at 303 (observing that "the idea of environment as a
human right first emerged in the international arena in 1968 when the General Assembly of the
United Nations recognized that technological changes could threaten the fundamental rights
of human beings").
150. David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward
and One Back or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 616 (1995) (explaining the modern trend to
recognize an "individual right to environment"); Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the
International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of Human Rights
Norms, 3 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 85, 85 (1990) ("The right of private individuals to be
guaranteed a decent and safe environment is one of the newer rubrics of human rights law that
has been recognized since the 1970s.").
151. See Thorme, supra note 146, at 309 (defining a number of abstract environmental
rights). Each of these characterizations is relative and can be defined according to different
societal standards of living. The basic rights to which I am referring apply uniformly to all
societies.
152. Id. at 301 (noting additionally that "[ihf these elements become polluted,
contaminated, or are eliminated or destroyed, life will cease to exist").
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'common interest' of humanity, underlies all legal and social systems." 154
Without recognizing codifications of the ancient right to survival,
nations will not achieve cooperative preservation. The first result of an
emphasis on modem rights,155 as opposed to historical ones, is the belief
that rights to the environment are still developing, owing to their relative
youth and that they require gradual development before gaining acceptance
as customary international law. 15 6 This view may also appear to violate
existing customary international law.'5 7 Namely, to rely on the more modem
categorization of environmental rights recognizes that "It]here is no legal
tradition in our system that recognizes rights to nature preservation...
[and] there is no historical experience on which to draw to give consent to
an asserted ecological right." 58 The second result is heightened attention to
current ideological differences between nations that favor isolationism and
ignore historical compromises that resulted in joint mitigation efforts. 59 By
recognizing the timeless applicability of the duty of cooperative
preservation, nations can develop a framework for its immediate
enforcement in dealing with threats posed by space bodies.
16 °
To begin, the right to survive, and nations' correlative duties to enforce
it, has been articulated for centuries. From the earliest days, the notion of
environmental sustainability in ancient Greece envisioned Goddess Earth, or
Gaia, for whom "provincial governors used to be promoted, rewarded or
153. See Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28
STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 105 (1991) (describing how basic rights are a "precondition" to all
others).
154. Id. at 110.
155. See supra note 146, at 309 (explaining a litany of contemporary rights falling short of
the bare essentials).
156. At best, these "laws" are considered to be "soft," which means that they are merely
"advisory" and "one day, might mature into customary international law." Wirth, supra note 150,
at 601 (adopting the softness definition articulated in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the
International Law of the Environment 12 MICH.J. INT'LL. 420,420-21 (1991)).
157. SeeJonathan I. Charney, May the President Violate Customary International Law?: The Power
of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to Nolate Customary International Law, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 913, 914-15 (1986) ("If a nation... seeks to alter an established rule of customary
international law, it must forge a new state practice .... This development takes time [because]
states interested in a new rule ... must take action that violates existing law and must encourage
others to do the same.").
158. Joseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 94
(1990).
159. The trouble caused by relying on contemporary rights to the environment is "that
humanity has survived for many centuries without the new rights, that the rights are not likely
to be implemented in anyway in the foreseeable future, and that these new rights merely cause
confusion because, they are vague and exaggerated in scope." Sohn, supra note 145, at 62.
160. In the case of The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900), the United States
Supreme Court addressed a claim relating to the validity of a longstanding practice by combing
history for the "earliest accessible sources" revealing its "increasing recognition." Among other
sources, the Court cited dated orders of King Henry IV of England from the fifteenth century to
establish the binding nature of the custom. Id.
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punished according to the condition of land under their jurisdiction. 161 In
fact, "[s]igns of erosion or other environmental damage led to
admonishment or even exile, whereas healthy-looking land, regardless of the
well being of its people, would be accorded approval. " 162  These
enforcements grew out of survival needs rather than politics. 163 The Bible
adopted a principle bearing the same result, stressing "life-support value" in
a number of passages. 64 Likewise, in Judaic history, the concept of bal
tashhit, a "biblical injunction," held that "[m] an bears the responsibility for
the destruction-complete or incomplete, direct or indirect-of all objects
that may be of potential benefit or use to mankind." 65 The codification of
environmental preservation for the purpose of ensuring survival also became
commonplace in the medieval era in the theories espoused by St. Thomas
Aquinas 166 and others.167 Part V.C argues that nations must collaborate to
fulfill that duty.
161. Krishna Prasad Oi, Legal Instruments for Sustainable Environmental Management in Nepa
2 ENV'T & HIST. 231, 231 (1996); see also id. at 232 (discussing the development of a Nepalese
sustainable resource management system dating to 2000 B.C. For the Greeks, these
punishments served a necessary societal role of maintaining stability by influencing the rational
observations of citizens. For example, see ERNST CASSIRER; THE MYTH OF THE STATE 76 (1946),
explaining Plato's conception that:
The self-preservation of the state cannot be secured by its material prosperity nor
can it be guaranteed by the maintenance of certain constitutional laws...
[because] [wi]ritten constitutions or legal charters have no real binding force, if
they are not the expression of a constitution that is written in the citizens' minds.
For Cassirer, the principle that endures in modem times is that identification with the
environment is the basis of social structure: "[b]y a first act of identification man asserts his
fundamental unity with his human or animal ancestors-by a second act he identifies his own
life with the life of nature." Id. at 39.
162. Oli, supra note 161, at 231.
163. See id. at 232 (characterizing the development of Nepalese codes of Smrities and
Manusmriti as "a survival strategy for the people").
164. Martin LaBar, A Biblical Perspective on Nonhuman Organisms: Values, Moral Considerability,
and Moral Agency, in RELIGION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 76, 79 (Eugene C. Hargrove ed.,
1986) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS CRISIS]. Authors specifically cite the "variety of references to food
and water," id., as proof of the concept of the "stability of nature." Id. at 84. But cf Susan Power
Bratton, Christian Ecotheology and the Old Testament, in RELIGIOUS CRISIS, supra, 53, 53 (noting that
"[h]istorians... have blamed either the church or biblical writings for encouraging abuse of
nature").
165. Johnathan Helfand, The Earth is the Lord's: Judaism and Environmental Ethics, in
RELIGIOUS CRISIS, supra note 164, at 38, 44-45 (explaining the legal basis for "[t] he nineteenth-
century Code of Shneour Zalman of Ladi").
166. SeeJOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY 191 (1998) (noting
St. Thomas Aquinas's premium on the "resources one needs for the very survival of oneself and
one's dependents," and that "everything one has is 'held as common.. .' in the sense that it is
morally available, as a matter of right and justice, to anyone who needs it to survive") (emphasis
in original). The axiom Aquinas established was that "in situations of extreme necessity,
everything becomes common, i.e., ownership or other legal title is morally superseded for the
duration of the situation." Id. at 192-93 n.30.
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C. NATIONS'DuTIFS TO CoOPERATE IN PEsERviNG THE SUBJECTS' SURVIVAL
The earliest notions of human preservation were inextricably linked
with theoretical conceptions of the individual as a political being. Thomas
Hobbes's theory of the reasoned individual existing in the state of nature is
perhaps the strongest support for an inalienable right to preservation. 6 s
According to Hobbes, the basis of the right is
the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will
himselfe [sic], for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say,
of his own Life; and consequently of doing any thing, which in his
own Judgment, and Reason, hee [sic] shall conceive to be the
aptest means thereunto.169
Thus, the justification for abiding by societal rules is the government's
assurance that the governed will survive. n ° Accordingly, all "[b]asic moral
167. See Oi, supra note 161, at 232 (explaining the legal system of "punishment for
environmentally unsound behaviour" adopted by Nepalese KingJayasthiti Malla of Kathmandu,
circa 422 A.D.); Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political
Life in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 3-4 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (explaining the
understanding of Manegold of Lautenbach, who in the eleventh century, described the King's
duties of establishing a "common good" of societal preservation in enforcing citizens' rights to
defend their property, and how it grew from the Sophists' assertion that "human beings came
together in political association for the self-interested reason of mutual defense"); RONALD W.
CARSTENS, THE MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTTLTIONALIsM 55 (1992) (crediting John of
Paris (1250/4-1304) for the ideal of "stewardship as an authorization to use or to distribute
goods," which held that "the community determines jurisdiction over the use of common
things"); id. at 81 (citing Marsilio of Padua (1275/80-1342), whose theory rested on the
Aristotelian notion that "[t he utility of government is measured by the degree to which it can
provide the conditions necessary for a 'sufficient life'"); Ren6 Dubos, Franciscan Conservation
Versus Benedictine Stewardship, in ECOLOGY AND RELIGION IN HISTORY 114, 123 (David Spring &
Eileen Spring eds., 1974) (noting that "[a]mong the great Christian teachers, none is more
identified with an ethic of nature than Francis of Assisi (1182?-1226), who treated all living
things and inanimate objects as if they were his brothers and sisters[,] [as if] ... arranged in a
continuous series-the Great Chain of Being").
168. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME & COMMONWEALTH,
EcCLEsLASTICALL AND CIVIL ch. XV, at 105 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904) (1651) (identifying
inalienable rights as those dealing with "all ... things without which a man cannot live, or live
well"). Hobbes also observed the sovereign's duty to protect those "things held in propriety,
those that are dearest to a man are his own life & limbs; and in the next degree (in most men),
those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living." Id. at ch.
XXX, at 248; GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 322 (1986)
("Hobbes argues that the right to resist wounds and imprisonment, as well as the right to resist
death, is inalienable."). But see id. (arguing that these rights are not inalienable because they
may be given as gifts).
169. HOBBES, supra note 168, at ch. XIV, at 186.
170. See KAVKA, supra note 168, at 317 (applying Hobbes's theory to conclude that one may
"reasonably refuse to abide by the results of a lifeboat lottery that [she] lose[s], on the grounds
that [she has] no assurance that the other party or parties would have complied had he or they
lost"). This allowance for self- rather than organizational-governance shows the importance of
States' protection of the environmental security of their citizens.
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rules are natural, in the sense of being derivable by reason from the





Just as the individual's ability to survive creates a unique reasoned
identity that allows for political action, theorist Friedrich Meinecke provided
that State action derives from this same nucleus. 17 In his view of raison d'etat,
or Reason of State, Meinecke opined: "The elementary biotic 'striving for
security and self-preservation at any price' is behind all conduct... and to
condemn and curse it is about as reasonable as to condemn and curse the
leopard for its spots."173 Meinecke believed that a State develops a
personality from "a great extension of the individual personality and its
sphere of life," in which "[t]he human being needs the community to
sustain him, and to receive his contributions in turn." 74 Because of this
symbiotic and dependent relationship, State "actions bear a general
character in that they spring from a natural impulse [of self-preservation]
which is permanent and common to all States. "175 In yet another passage,
Meinecke notes that justified State actions are those that exist "only as a
means towards a rationally predetermined object[:] for the sake of the
security, [or] the well being" of its members.176 In other words, the authority
of a nation to govern depends on the State's ability to meet its citizens' most
basic survival needs. From this principle, it follows that nations must work
together to prevent threats that may potentially devastate any or all of them.
The Island of Palmas decision so stated, when. the arbitrator recognized the
following:
Territorial sovereignty... involves the exclusive right to display the
activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation
to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in
particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in
war, together with the rights which each State may claim for its
nationals in foreign territory. Without manifesting its territorial
171. Id. at 452 (emphasis in original).
172. For a more modem conception that the right of a collective to survive is rooted in
individual rights to survive, consider the case of Franklin Township v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 452 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1982), which held that a town was inextricably linked with
the individuals who lived in it, thus giving the town standing to sue for the individual
constitutional right to environment.
173. W. Stark, Editor's Introduction, in FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, MACHIAvELLISM: THE DOCTRINE
OF RAISON D'ETAT AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN HISTORY xxxii (Douglas Scott trans., 1957) (1924)
[hereinafter MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLISM].
174. FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE NATIONAL STATE 14 (Felix Gilbert
trans., 1970).
175. MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLISM, supra note 173, at 2.
176. Id. at 213; see Margaret Gruter, The Origins of Legal Behavior, 2 J. Soc. BIOLOGICAL
STRUCTURES 43, 43 (1979) (observing a self-preserving philosophy in the development of
domestic and international law and highlighting that "legal behavior" is often "an innate
biological mechanism, vital for survival").
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sovereignty in a manner corresponding to circumstances, the State
cannot fulfil this duty. Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to
its negative side, i.e. to excluding the activities of other States; for it
serves to divide between nations the space upon which human
activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the
minimum of protection of which international law is the
guardian.
177
In the Earth collision context, or in the case of similar transboundary
disasters where borders might change at any minute based on the migration
patterns of citizens hoping to sustain themselves, all Earth becomes the
protected "space upon which human activities are employed," that is,
protected by the mutual obligation to enforce the global right to survival. 78
The many environmental rights found in both national and state
constitutions provide a strong argument that historical conceptions of the
right to global survival continue to this day. Seven American states have
language in their constitutions establishing rights to a healthy
environment.179 Of these states, Hawaii and Illinois have made these rights
self-executing-meaning they are actionable by individuals without enabling
legislation. 18 Pennsylvania and Montana have not directly created self-
executing rights to a healthy environment, but in both the of these states,
"courts have interpreted the [constitutional] provision[s] as allowing
177. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 Rep. Int'l Arbitral Awards 829, 839 (1928)
(Penn. Ct Arb. 1928).
178. This theme is similar, yet distinct, from international decisions validating otherwise
unlawful acts on the basis of necessity to self-preserve. See CHENG, supra note 134, at 71
(defining the requirements of a necessity plea involving peril sufficient to "'supercede[] all
laws,' 'dissolve[] the distinctions of property and rights' and justif[y] the 'seizure and
application to our own use of that which belongs to others'" (quoting The Neptune, reprinted in
IV INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATONS: MODERN SERIEs 372, 433 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1931)
(decided in 1797)). Appeals to necessity, however, require that the peril be "actual and not
merely apprehended." CHENG, supra note 134, at 71. The claim might arguably survive scrutiny
in the realm of a serious Earth impact if the collision would be so immense as to render
impossible spontaneous acts of self-preservation, instead requiring prior planning.
179. See, e.g., HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 9 ("Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment."); ILL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 1 (amended 2001) ("The public policy of the State and
the duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of
this and future generations."); MASS. CONST. ANN. art. XLIX (amended 2001) ("The people
shall have the right to clean air and water.., and the natural ... qualities of their environment;
and the protection of the people in their right to conservation, development and utilization of
... natural resources is ... a public purpose."); MONT. CONST. art. I1, § 3 ("All persons...
[have inalienable rights to] a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's
basic necessities."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (noting that the people "shall be secure in their
rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state ... and it shall be the duty
of the general assembly to provide for the conservation of air, land, water... and other natural
resources of the state").
180. Mary Ellen Cusack, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a
HealthfulEnvironmen 20 B.C. ENvrT. AFF. L. REV. 173,183-84 (1993).
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individuals to assert [environmental rights] claims." i"' While some
constitutional provisions guard against interference with citizens' use and
enjoyment of the environment, both Illinois and Rhode Island "specifically
place a duty on the state government to preserve and maintain a healthful• 182
environment. Absent these specific duties, courts in most states
protecting such environmental rights overwhelmingly hold governments
responsible for their enforcement.183 A number of nations follow the same
principle.184
Because states and nations with different values have identified the
same basic needs, international conceptions of these rights do not differ to
the degree that would necessarily render the right unenforceable. 1
181. Id at 185.
182. Id. at 192 (noting additionally that Montana's provisions place "obligation[s] to
respect each individual's right to a healthful environment on all persons, individual and
government actors alike").
183. See id. at 195 ("In general, state courts hearing these claims have recognized that
[environmental] constitutional provisions... do place obligations on a state government to
preserve and maintain the environment.").
184. See BRAZ. CONST. art. 225 (1998), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 26 (Gilbert H. Flanz ed., 2001) ("Everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced
environment, which is a public good for the people's use and is essential for a healthy life. The
Government and the community have a duty to defend and preserve the environment for
present and future generations."). Most sources cite the Brazilian Constitution as a key example
of the right and duty to protect the environment. See also Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert,
Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad,
16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 82 tbl.1 (1992) (citing five nations' constitutions that guarantee
fundamental environmental protections); Wirth, supra note 150, at 617:
The constitutions of a number of States, including... Chile, Ecuador, Honduras,
the Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, South
Africa, and Spain, explicitly pronounce an individual right to a clean and healthy
environment. In addition, the constitutions of others, including China, Greece,
India, Iran, Nambia, the Netherlands, Panama, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Thailand,
create a related but distinct duty on the part of the state to protect and preserve
the environment for the benefit of individuals.
185. See ALEX INKELES, NATIONAL CHARACTER: A PSYCHO-SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 139 (1997)
("Since all human beings manifest the same basic needs, we cannot assert that some need is
unique to a given national population."). Inkeles goes on to suggest the following:
Every social system depends for sustained existence on the presence in its status
incumbents of certain psychic characteristics .... Because all social systems have
certain requirements that are extremely general, it follows that in certain respects
the psychic structure of all populations must share some psychological properties
in common. These constitute the common psychic core of humankind .... The
features of personality having this "system-typed" character will be those more
required by or adaptive to, the main features of ecology....
Id- at 208-09. Professor Inkeles shows that citizens of the world are linked by basic needs to
survive and then nationally linked by more State-specific practices. Accordingly, those critics
who claim, for example, that "as long as the law of human rights is in turmoil, [S]tates cannot
be expected to agree on implementation measures," Sohn, supra note 145, at 62, are addressing
materializations of the national personality, rather than the global one. But, in all cases, a
1128 [2002]
WISHING ONA STAR
Although several incompatible beliefs prevent all states and nations from
providing citizens exactly the same environmental protections, a fine line
separates citizens' most basic needs from needs that have evolved based on
political or cultural considerations. The right to survive in the environment,
as I have defined it, exists as the most common denominator among all
governments, local or national, and is necessary for their very existence. 18
Historically entrenched practices continue to shape the world's disaster-
based laws. Perhaps the most potent instance of an international duty of
preservation guiding international legal decisions was Skylab's emergency
descent to the Earth in 1979.1 7 Although several nations realized this
orbiting space station was about to fall, they did not know the extent of the
danger it would pose, 188 much like the threat of a space body falling from
the sky.8 9 NASA and the State Department employed a legal strategy based
on the notion of global preservation. Not only did these agencies recognize
the duty to mitigate damage in other countries,19° their plan called for
deflecting space debris into the United States in order to avoid harming
person must be able to live before she can claim a national identity.
186. In recognition of all individuals' most basic needs, international courts have found
States warranted in acting on behalf their own nationals when a host nation's treatment of these
aliens constitutes "an outrage... [,] bad faith ... willful neglect of duty, or... an insufficiency
of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency." Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 Rep. Int'l
Arbitral Awards 60, 61-62 (U.S.-Mex. Claims Comm'n 1926). Notwithstanding other duties to
preserve human life, Neer signifies the notion that certain minimal living conditions can be so
abhorrent as to require international intervention.
187. Skylab was an orbiting space station that NASA used to conduct a number of space
missions. Because NASA administrators launched the station without planning for its reentry
into the Earth's atmosphere, the station created a great deal of international panic when it
drifted back toward the Earth and broke into a number of pieces. See generally Skylab Hearings,
supra note 71, at 9-39 (1978 Battelle Report).
188. See Talma Kushnir, Skylab Effects: Psychological Reactions to a Human-Made Environmental
Hazard, 14 ENV'T & BEHAV. 84, 84-85 (1982) ("While the fall was inevitable, its exact timing,
location, and consequences were unpredictable.").
189. The precedential value of this event may be more valuable than "anecdotal" evidence
about minimal asteroid harms humans have experienced in the past. See id. at 89 (noting public
disinterest in falling meteors, but recognizing that "the fall of Skylab was the first (and much
publicized) [international] event of its kind"). The threat was so similar to an asteroid impact
that NASA, in creating an emergency plan to deal with the Skylab threat, analogized this man-
made disaster to an asteroid impact. See generally Skylab Hearings, supra note 71, at 9-39 (1978
Battelle Report) (comparing Skylab debris with space bodies).
190. See Skylab Hearings, supra note 71, at 73 (statement of Dr. Robert A. Frosch, NASA
Administrator):
In the event of an impact in a foreign country, if the foreign country chooses to
accept U.S. assistance, NASA would be notified by the Department of State and
would deploy its [debris identification] teams as required [to compensate victims
for damage]. NASA personnel would be under the jurisdiction of the ambassador
while in that country. Assistance would be provided by the DOD [medical and
engineering teams], as appropriate.
1129
87 IOWA LAWREVIEW
more densely populated regions.1 91 The Skylab emergency plan provides a
legal framework for establishing an international obligation to mitigate
asteroid or comet impacts. But the risk posed by an asteroid or comet impact
necessitates the identification of more detailed and concrete obligations.
1 92
Viewed alone, the station's descent leaves many questions unanswered
regarding the limits of international cooperation.
193
VI. MODERN MANIFESTATIONS OF THE GLOBAL DUTYTO COOPERATE IN SELF-
PRESERVATION EFFORTS
Although the previous section highlighted evidence of the express duty
191. The following dramatic dialogue between Congressman John L. Burton and NASA's
Administrator, Dr. Robert A. Frosch, should aid the present inquiry substantially:
Mr. BURTON:... My question to you is, I guess, a pretty tough question. If it
looks like [Skylab] might fall on India, which has a heavy population, we could
adjust its orbit, and then it might fall on America.
Dr. FROSCH. That is correct. We have proceeded and are proceeding on the
view that the problem is to decrease further the small probability of injury to a
human being anywhere.
Mr. BURTON. That is very noble. I think it is the first time-we spend billions
of dollars making sure nobody injures us, and I think it is very noble that one of
our own agencies would be willing to take a chance on the slight injury happening
to the American people who are paying for the program as against Indians because
India has a very dense population.
Skylab Hearings, supra note 71, at 80.
This duty to bear a national threat to save human life was not articulated in the treaties
to which the United States was obligated by law, such as the Outer Space Treaty or the Liability
Convention. Rather, the duty derived from the historically entrenched right of global
preservation, which projected from the individual level to all of the international society.
Although, in part, the United States was surely motivated by its responsibility for launching
Skylab, the principle articulated by Dr. Frosch still represents a commitment to general
principles of cooperative preservation. After all, nations collaborated in a similar way,
developing a global contingency plan for the eventual descent of the Mir, even though they had
not created the threat. For example, it was said that the United States "Federal Emergency
Management Agency [was] on standby," Michael Cabbage, Down it Goes, Where Mir Will Land,
Nobody Knows; The Station Should Crash at Sea, but Russia is Hedging its Bets, ORLANDO SENTINEt,
Mar. 18, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File, and "[tihe Defense
Dept. pulled together a network of all U.S. government agencies to monitor the descent with
Space Command in Colorado Springs the lead agency." Frank Sietzen, Jr., Mir. Resting in Peace,
AEROSPACE AMERICA, May 2001, at 36, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File. In
fact, "'[miore than 80 countries... expressed an interest in the reentry,'" including Japan,
which activated all of its emergency personnel, and Australia, which developed detailed
international contingencies. Id. (quoting David Templeman, Australia's Emergency
Management Director General).
192. Major differences between the Skylab threat and the general threat of asteroid or
comet impact are the amount of warning prior to the potential disaster and that the size of the
impacting object and the corresponding damage posed in Skylab's case was significantly less
threatening than an asteroid or comet impact.
193. See Brooks, supra note 37, at 248 (explaining the unresolved legal questions pertaining
to potential space body collisions).
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to self-preserve and the related obligation to attain this objective
collaboratively, a review of international agreements guiding nations in
times of crisis should guide the efforts of lawmakers in achieving cooperative
preservation, especially in recognizing the obligation to act beyond merely
warning of impending danger. Such duties also show how historical
conceptions of that right have evolved in step with modem technological
advances.
On the basis of various treaties alone, several commentators have
suggested that binding international obligations arise.9 Certain doctrines
address the questions posed by nuclear threats, while others address
problems arising from falling space debris from man-made objects, and still
others the problems associated with transboundary pollutants. 195 As long as
these obligations are directed at preventing harm, it follows logically that
threats from space bodies come within their ambit, owing to the potential
severity of damage and the threat to life. The following sections explore
existing duties to warn and to take responsive action.
A. DuTES TO WARN OFIMPENDING DANGER
Governments that become aware of significant impending danger often
must contact those entities they know to be directly at risk, even when the
threat is likely to occur outside their own territorial limits. In the United
States, for example, constitutional scholars have argued that the Preamble of
the Constitution implies a duty to warn citizens of impending dangers.
196
More recent affirmations of this duty occur in statutes that require
communities to notify citizens about toxic and industrial hazards. 197 This
duty derives from either a "right to know" about environmental health risks,
as the obligation is recognized in the United States, or from a "need to
know," as it is recognized by other nations.19s In either case, governments
must alert citizens of certain facts that might increase their safety in times of
194. See WEISS, supra note 114, at 70-79 (explaining the existence of shared international
duties emerging from treaties before 1988).
195. See infra notes 203, 207 and accompanying text (explaining respective provisions of
varied agreements between States).
196. SeeBrooks, supra note 37, at 243 (citing the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution to show
an "obligation to notify... citizens of any possible threat to life").
197. See, e.g., The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
11001-11050 (1994) (requiring states to coordinate for the identification and dissemination of
chemical risks to the public); 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(c), 11003 (1994) (mandating comprehensive
emergency and evacuation plans for chemical facilities posing public risks); Council Directive
82/501/EEC on Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, 1982 O.J. (L 230) (as
amended by 87/216/EEC, 19 Mar. 1987, and 88/8610/EEC, 24 Nov. 1988 (also known as the
Seveso Directive)) (requiring European states to collect and disseminate information about
public industrial risks through a Central Commission).
198. See Gary Rischitelli, Developing a Global Right to Know, 2 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 110
(1995) (noting how both duties emerge from environmental health risks).
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danger. The significance of these duties is abundantly clear in current tort
law, which holds governments financially responsible for inadequate public
notification of known natural hazards.1 99
Nations have recognized obligations to warn each other of impending
peril similar to those obligations adopted for the safety of their own
200citizens. Such international treaties demonstrate "beyond reasonable
dispute that the duty to notify potentially affected states of a transnational
disaster has reached the level of customary international law."20 ' This duty
202
emerges from multiple sources, including judicial decisions and general
agreements. °3
Some of the duties to warn relate directly to space disasters. For
example, the Outer Space Treaty contains key provisions that collectively
suggest a duty to warn nations of any space-related threat. Article V
addresses notification directly,2°4 while Articles I and V mandate sensitivity
199. For example, see Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 545 P.2d 13, 17-18 (Wash. 1975) (en
banc), which held that a state was financially responsible for public injuries resulting from its
failure to issue adequate warnings, which includes the complete failure to notify the public of
dangers.
200. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (explaining provisions of various
agreements).
201. McClatchey, supra note 109, at 669.
202. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1938)
(holding that "no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury... in or to the territory of another"); Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.CJ. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (confirming the State duty "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
contrary to the rights of other states" and holding that Albania had a duty to warn British ships
about its mined harbors); cf. PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 14144 (1992) (explaining alternative conceptions of the Corfu Channel holding,
limiting the duty to dangers in a State's own territory).
203. See Convention on Early Notification of A Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, 1439
U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force Oct. 27, 1986, signed but not ratified by the U.S.), 25 I.L.M.
1370, art. (1) (mandating notification of "an international transboundary release that could be
of radiological safety significance for another State"); Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, arts: 6, 8, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1464 (mandating the sharing of
information about potential environmental risks in Article 6 and requiring notification of major
impacts to both the public and parties involved in scientific activities in Article 8); RIO
DECLARATION, supra note 18 (proclaiming, in Principle 18, that States must "immediately notify
other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden
harmful effects on the environment of those States" and, in Principle 19, that "States shall
provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States on
activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary effect and shall consult with those
States at an early stage and in good faith").
204. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. V, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty or
OST] ("States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform other States Parties to the Treaty
or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer
space... which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts."). Alone, this
provision seems to avoid threats extending beyond astronauts in space. See Brooks, supra note
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towards all nations' interests2°5 and international cooperation in all space
operations. °6 While the OST may only touch on the exploration of space,
other resolutions concerning space obligate nations to act on similar, if not
heightened, duties of notification. Two such duties address nuclear power
20 7
and remote sensing technologies. 20 In particular, these regulations require
any nation with the capability of monitoring an object in space to do so for
the benefit of potential victims in other nations. 2°9 Because nations are
required to act on these doctrines regardless of the resources they are able
to commit, nations should be required to treat threats posed by space bodies
in a similar manner. But duties to warn of asteroid impacts are less crucial
than the related obligation to respond to the devastation that may follow on
the heels of such warnings.
B. DuTES TO ACT BEYOND WARNING
Unlike duties to warn nations of danger, duties to act beyond simply
giving warning imply that nations must mobilize their own resources to aid
others. These concerns prompt some scholars to argue that a nation must
take care of its own citizens before aiding the people of other countries
(e.g., that any aid provided to the people of other countries will mean
37, at 245 (arguing that Article V "falls short of [asteroid impact] notification of dangers to the
population of the world at large"). Yet, in the context of Articles I and IV, the provision's
mandate may extend further. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
205. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 204, at art. I (conveying that "[t l he exploration and
use of outer space... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries
206. See id. at art. IV (requiring that all States' actions are "guided by the principle of co-
operation and mutual assistance" and conducted with "due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States party to the Treaty").
207. See Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, GA. Res. 47/68,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/47/20 prin. 7(1) (1992) [hereinafter
NuearPowerPrinciples]:
Upon the notification of an expected re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere of a
space object containing a nuclear power source.., all States possessing space
monitoring and tracking facilities, in the spirit of international cooperation, shall
communicate the relevant information that they may have ... to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and the State concerned as promptly as possible to
allow States that might be affected to access the situation and take precautionary
measures.
208. See Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, GA. Res. 41/65, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., prin. 11 (1986):
Remote sensing shall promote the protection of mankind from natural disasters.
To this end, States participating in remote sensing activities that have identified
processed data and analyzed information in their possession that may be useful to
States affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected by impending natural
disasters, shall transmit such data and information to States concerned as promptly
as possible.
209. See supra notes 207-08.
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leaving its own citizens' needs unmet) 210 Despite these arguments,
numerous international agreements create a duty to actively prevent harm
21'
212and develop future plans for decreasing known or inevitable risks of harm.
For example, Article 28 of the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
requires all Watercourse States to "immediately take all practicable measures
necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate
213harmful effects" of natural disasters occurring in their territory. Article 27
also requires joint disaster mitigation activities, regardless of the disaster's
origin.21 4 Such duties collectively suggest an international obligation to assist
threatened nations upon learning of impending danger.
Outer Space law also provides for duties to mobilize resources in the
case of danger. Aside from its warning provision, The Outer Space Treaty
(OST) proclaims that nations capable of so doing must render aid to
215astronauts in danger. While the OST limits the scope of danger to harm
encountered in space, Article V stresses the fact that astronauts in distress
require access to common resources while the danger exists. 216 For the same
reason, the Treaty also compels nations to aid astronauts who land in their
territory.217 This duty to limit harm, considered with other duties discussed
210. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 9
(1996) (noting that critics of extending obligations can always complain that "recognizing the
right in question would place too great a burden on all the other people with the duties to
honor the right").
211. See Wirth, supra note 150, at 639 n.106 (identifying numerous treaties requiring state
intervention to limit damage).
212. See id. at 638 n.108 (identifying treaties requiring states to adopt preventive disaster
emergency response plans).
213. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, art. 28 (3), U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994), available at http://wwvw.un.org/law/ilc/texts/94nonnav.pdf#pagemode=
bookmarks.
214. Id. at art. 27 (requiring States to "individually orjointly, take all appropriate measures
to prevent or mitigate conditions that may be harmful to other... States, whether resulting
from natural causes or human conduct").
215. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 204, at art. V ("In carrying on activities in outer
space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible
assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.").
216. Note the similarity of this provision to historical theories about duties of preservation,
most notably those of Aquinas discussed supra note 166.
217. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 204, at art. V ("States Parties to the Treaty shall
regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible
assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another
State Party or on the high seas."). This doctrine is similar to the treaty covering emergency
landings of aircraft. See Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art.
25, 59 Stat. 1516, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 312 (outlining State duties to "provide such measures of
assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable" as well as the duty to
allow aid from the country of origin in both searching for missing planes and providing
assistance to downed pilots and passengers).
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earlier, suggests that space-related disasters command a different set of
international obligations on the part of sovereign nations. Principle VII of
the Nuclear Power Principles highlights this unique responsibility by
requiring nations to limit harm even if they have nothing to do with its
creation.218 This Principle recognizes the fact that nuclear threats potentially
endanger the entire globe and transcend sovereign rights to refuse to
provide aid. An Earth collision differs from nuclear disaster only in its
heightened severity, a realization that should compel at least the same
international obligation.
VII. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
Although both historic obligations and existing practices reveal an
international commitment to both self-preservation and shared
international disaster relief obligations, questions remain regarding the
willingness of nations to adhere to cooperative preservation efforts
respecting space bodies. After all, nations often neglect even those treaties
to which they have joined as parties.2 9 But, in the context of preventive
measures to mitigate unforeseeable threats, cooperative preservation does
not envision punishment for noncompliance. Instead, the legal concepts I
have presented above should provide compelling reasons to evaluate
environmental security risks in a new light-one where nations that are
willing to address the issue can do so in an orderly way-with processes
spelling out the delineation of responsibilities.
Certain dangers are so devastating that, upon their occurrence,
governments inevitably develop plans to prevent similar harm. Chernobyl,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the World Trade Center attacks all marked
events so horrific that nations rallied the resources to make a sustained
collective effort necessary to regulate matters.22° If an asteroid or comet of
218. See Nuclear Power Principls, supra note 207, at prin. 7(2) (b) (holding that "[a]ll states,
other than the launching state, with relevant technical capabilities and international
organizations with such technical capabilities shall, to the extent possible, provide necessary
assistance upon request by an affected State"). Note, however, that the principles are non-
binding.
219. See Watson, supra note 38, at 782 (doubting the power of treaties to secure
international legal compliance).
220. In an effort to respond to the horrors of Chernobyl, governments collectively
developed new principles delineating duties to prevent such harm. See McClatchey, supra note
109, at 666-69 (attributing provisions of the Rio Declaration and the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
specifically to Chernobyl). Likewise, to prevent nuclear fallout, the nature of that experienced
following the bombing of Japan in the 1940s, the international community coordinated to
regulate the testing of such weaponry. See United Nations Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
Sept. 24, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/50/1027, Annex, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1439 (1996) (articulating
guidelines). Not surprisingly, nations promptly joined forces in the new war on terrorism
following attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. See Paul de Ia Garza & Dong-
Phuong Nguyen, Macill's New Village' Helps Coordinate Globe, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 27,
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significant mass should strike a populated area, citizens of the world would
undoubtedly expect to see implemented many of the preventive efforts I
have urged.2 After all, nations must prevent their citizens from returning to
the Hobbesian state of nature described in Part V.C. 222 When nations do not
adequately handle serious threats, their citizens will often lose faith in
223figures of power. As a result, governments tend to respond immediately,
and perhaps in an even more exaggerated way than necessary, to assure
2001, at IA, available atLEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (describing the development of
one of many "coalition village [s]," which are coordination centers that combine the expertise of
several nations' task forces in fighting terrorism).
221. Cf FRAZIER, supra note 13, at 339 (explaining how "ironically, it often takes a disaster
to get people [and governments] to prepare for (the next) disaster").
222. For at least three days after a serious disaster, life for the average citizen often
resembles a state of anarchy, where governments are unable to function in their authoritative
role. See Lisa A. Russell et al., Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Actions Before and After Two
Earthquakes, 27 ENV'T & BEHAV. 744, 745 (1995) (describing how "the normal flow of goods and
services will be disrupted [and] emergency personnel will be overwhelmed and unable to
respond to every need" following a disaster like a major earthquake).
223. For the most part, most citizens are inexperienced with threats of a high magnitude.
They perceive horrific results. See Kushnir, supra note 188, at 89-91 (describing "unrealistically
high" perceptions of risks based on mental cues that influence victims to imagine the worst
experiences conceivable and a general "fear of science and technology"). Citizens also
overestimate the government's ability to respond to them. See Russell et al., supra note 222, at
768-69 (describing how the public "overestimate[s]" a government's ability to respond to its
needs during times of emergency). Often, they are likely to perceive deception on the part of
the government because their expectations of the government exceeded its abilities. For
example, Suzanne Keller, in Ecology and Community, in LAW, VALUES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
READERAND SELECTrIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY 10, 13 (Robert N. Wells,Jr., ed., 1996), noted:
Perhaps the most serious consequence of major environmental accidents.., is the
ensuing decline in respect for authority in science and politics. Survivors of these
accidents discredit the scientific elite for both its technical failures and its self-
righteous arrogance. They resent the political authorities for their incompetence,
deception, and disparagement of the public. Typically, there is outrage at the long
delays by officials in responding to the emergency. Moreover, what the officials
finally offer is generally too little and too late... When the authorities fail to
respond, it increases the collusion that citizens perceive exists between scientists
and governments.
While this commentator referred to common perceptions of man-made environmental disasters
like Chernobyl or Bhopal, these public perceptions were based on the same lack of anticipation
that likely characterizes asteroid and comet collisions. In other words, "[blecause we do not
anticipate such accidents, we cannot effectively prepare for them or respond to them." Id. at 11.
Yet another similarity between those accidents and asteroid or comet threats is "technological
overconfidence." Id.; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing similar
preoccupations with NEO cataloguing efforts). Perhaps public distrust in government will be
more likely following an asteroid or comet impact, given scientists' common "official
response ... [of] discount[ing] the magnitude of the accident [with the hope of] minimiz[ing]
the human suffering that it engendered." Keller, supra, at 10. Prior planning with other
countries will reinforce the hopes of citizens in devastated communities that help will be on the
way, giving them a reason to comply with interim State mandates. At the very least, increased
public trust may slow the panicked migration of people perceiving a state of total anarchy in
their own devastated regions.
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their citizens that their safety vill be preserved. This Note holds nations to a
higher standard of responsibility. Nations should no longer be preoccupied
with the present, but should plan for the future. Governments must address
serious concerns about allocating scarce resources and lay plans to cope with
the horrific realities that will inevitably accompany megadisasters.
Identifying legal bases to cooperate is more important than simply
outlining the innerworkings of international organizations that one hopes
will fulfil such obligations. Organizational models abound. For example,
shortly after the devastation of the atomic bombings in Japan, Bernard
Baruch urged the development of a single international entity to regulate all
224atomic issues. At the heart of the Baruch Proposal was the realization that
certain threats may be so devastating as to require a united effort of all
humankind.2  Cooperative preservation envisions a similar organizational
response to threats to environmental security. Perhaps the United Nations
might develop a Convention on Asteroid Mitigation and Transnational
Natural Disasters, with the goal of establishing an independent organization
to develop protocols for dealing with megadisasters.225 Establishing an
224. See Honorable Bernard M. Baruch, United States Proposals for the Control of Atomic
Energy, Presented by the Honorable Bernard M. Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission, (June 14, 1946), in THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS, REP. SERIES
No. 7, at 169 (1947) [hereinafter Baruch Proposal].
225. Id at 169-72:
In this crisis, we represent not only our governments but, in a larger way,
we represent the peoples of the world. We must remember that the
peoples do not belong to the governments but that the governments
belong to the peoples .... The United States proposes the creation of an
International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be
entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy.
The Baruch Proposal covered international "Managerial control," "Power to control,
inspect and license," "The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy," and
"Research and development responsibilities," because "peoples . . . would not believe-and
without faith nothing counts-that a treaty, merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic
bomb, constitutes effective fulfillment of [the world's needs]." Id at 172.
226. The organization could look somewhat similar to the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR), the international organization that has functioned for the last four
decades in Antarctica. See The Future of Antarctic Research. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Basic
Research of the Comm. on Sci., 104th Cong. 106 (1996) (describing how the Antarctic Treaty of
1959 "permits its Parties to undertake cooperative activities and agree on collective regulation
of those activities" by using "consensus as the basic principle of decision-making" and using
"substantial scientific research.., as the basis for full participation in decision-making"). While
SCAR "has no formal ties to the Antarctic Treaty, [it] serves as a source of expert scientific
opinion" to guide the decisions necessary for the enactment of treaty provisions by "provid[ing]
a continuing mechanism for the Antarctic scientific community to identify research priorities in
Antarctica and promote cooperate efforts for their achievement." Id at 168. Unlike the Deep
Seabed Authority, SCAR has enjoyed years of successful operation. The Seabed Authority has
experienced paralyzing tension for the last few decades. See generally de La Fayette, supra note 35
(describing seabed tensions). Additionally, when nations face threats from space, these dangers
will be similar to threats occurring in the harsh and desolate Arctic tundra, i.e., nations will be
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international body to deal with specific threats and develop binding
227
solutions is not foreign to the United Nations. The most appropriate
vehicle for mitigating Earth impacts by space bodies would mirror ProfessorS• 228
Christopher Stone's recommendations. For the past several years, Stone
has fostered the establishment of a "system of guardians who would be legal
representatives for the natural environment. "2  These guardians, would be
endowed with special rights:
[T]he guardian would be built into the institutional process ....
[I]ts first chore would be to monitor. It would review
[environmental] conditions not just to gather facts
"scientifically".... Second, the Guardian would exercise legislative
function, not as a legislative body, but as part of a complex web of
global policy-making institutions .... It could appear before
international agencies [concerning its discoveries and
recommendations] .... Third, it could be authorized to appear as
a special intervenor-counsel.... International treaties should endow
the Guardian with standing to initiate legal and diplomatic
210action....
Because several organizations are currently empowered to deal with
231
environmental harm less devastating than the harm posed by asteroids,
nations should develop a similar organization to address all transboundary
megadisasters.
In the final analysis, regardless of our efforts to combat unknown
environmental threats, "[]ust as avoiding an all-out nuclear exchange
becomes a first priority of superpowers, so avoiding general environmental
able to use only those mitigation strategies that they developed prior to the threatening event
through collaborative efforts. For example, see Beebe, supra note 91, at 1769 n.241, who
suggests that outer space, similar to Antarctica, is "like the top of Mount Everest, a place to
which a man goes briefly to conquer or to die, and to which he does not take his wife and
children." In other words, when facing a threat from space, countries will likewise be helpless
without the aid of prior planning and collaboration.
227. The Ozone Convention, for example, requires international research and cooperation
to achieve the control of human activities through a system of observation and correction. See
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 1985, arts. 3-4, 26 I.L.M. 1529
(1987) (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988) (outlining international responsibilities to
collaborate).
228. See STONE, How to Heal the Planet, in ENvIRONMENTAL EssAYS, supra note 112, at 81-99
(exploring organizational responses to nations' duties to protect the environment).
229. Id. at 87 (comparing environmental guardians to "conservators" in familiar legal
systems).
230. Id at 87-88 (emphasis in original).
231. For example, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is currently
"trustee for fish, marine mammals, and their supporting ecosystems within the U.S. fisheries




collapse becomes a first priority of all responsible states."23 2 Collisions with
Earth pose serious questions that perhaps only a diverse group of committed
policymakers are capable of addressing successfully. 233 By realizing the
general principle of cooperative preservation and the need for proactive and
anticipatory action to mitigate transnational disasters, we can begin to
answer the legal questions relating to asteroid or comet impacts. Perhaps,
these very principles will inform our understanding of the legal obligations
related to other low probability, high consequence transnational crises.
Congressman Burton's fears about the U.S. government's role during
the time of the Skylab crisis illustrate the concerns expressed in this Note: "I
think I know what NASA is doing. They know they cannot control this, and
they are scared to death. They don't know what to do. They will just do
nothing and keep their fingers crossed, and maybe it will end up in the
Indian Ocean."M In other words, when Earth faces its next space-body
collision crisis, let us hope and pray that there exists a functioning
organization in which we can place our faith, rather than merely wishing on
a star, for the survival of our species.
232. OCEANS, supra note 24, at 8.
233. Consider the array of unanswered asteroid impact questions posed by Dr. Eugene
Brooks, supra note 37, at 248.
234. Skylab Hearings, supra note 71, at 177.
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